Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 78

Issue 1

Article 8

Winter 2021

The FDA’s Power Over Non-Therapeutic Uses of Drugs and
Devices
Patricia J. Zettler
The Ohio State University, zettler.25@osu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Food and Drug Law Commons, and the Health Law and
Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Patricia J. Zettler, The FDA’s Power Over Non-Therapeutic Uses of Drugs and Devices, 78 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 379 (2022).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol78/iss1/8
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

The FDA’s Power Over
Non-Therapeutic Uses of Drugs and
Devices
Patricia J. Zettler*
Abstract
Although we often—and rightly—think of the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) as regulating important therapies
for patients, the agency also can regulate non-therapeutic uses of
drugs and devices. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
defines drugs and devices as including not only products
intended to address disease but also those intended to affect the
structure or function of the body, such as cognitive
enhancements, wrinkle removers, and recreational drugs.
Indeed, if these broad definitions were read literally, many
everyday consumer products—such as winter jackets intended to
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keep wearers’ warm—may be drugs or devices. Accordingly,
Congress, courts, and the agency itself have sought reasonable
limits on the definitions.
This Article critiques one limit that is sometimes offered:
that the FDA cannot regulate certain non-therapeutic
technologies because those technologies cannot be shown to be
safe and effective. A careful review of the FDA’s past decisions on
non-therapeutic uses reveals that this reasoning is descriptively
incorrect. Further, examining the purposes of FDA oversight
demonstrates that the agency is not necessarily normatively
required to set an insurmountable bar for showing the safety and
effectiveness of non-therapeutic uses. Reconsidering this
reasoning as a limit on FDA jurisdiction is warranted at a time
when evolutions in both policy and science are opening the door
to a potentially diverse market of new, or newly legal,
non-therapeutic technologies.
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INTRODUCTION
Each fall as Halloween approaches, stories of the dangers
of costume contact lenses—lenses that change the consumer’s
eye color or give the appearance of, for example, cat or zombie
eyes—saturate the media.1 News reports tell of consumers who
have contracted serious eye infections or suffered injuries, such
1. See, e.g., Robert Preidt, Skip Costume Contact Lenses This Halloween,
U.S. NEWS (Oct. 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/73LX-SDNY (“Halloween is risky
enough this year with the coronavirus pandemic, so don't risk your vision as
well by wearing costume contact lenses, the American Academy of
Ophthalmology (AAO) says.”); Austin Williams, Woman Rushed to ER after
Colored Contact Lenses She Bought at Store for Halloween Nearly Blind Her,
FOX 5 WASH. D.C. (Oct. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/YJW2-DH3P (believing that
the FDA authorized the non-prescription lenses she purchased, the woman
wore the lenses for a week until her eyes began to “burn, turn red, and become
extremely sensitive to light” due to corneal infection); Phillip Yuhas, The
Scariest Part of Halloween May Be the Costume Contact Lenses, an Eye Doctor
Says, CONVERSATION (Oct. 28, 2019, 9:09 AM), https://perma.cc/9FLE-A5KY
(“Poorly fitting costume lenses can cause many eye problems, including
surface abrasions, allergic reactions and blurred vision.”); Venessa Wong,
Those Colored Contact Lenses Can Seriously Damage Your Eyes and People
Are Worried, BUZZFEED (Nov. 1, 2017, 5:32 PM), https://perma.cc/4MM7CBNY (warning individuals “of the hazards and the strong possibility of
permanent eye damageincluding blindnessfrom wearing over-the-counter
colored contact lenses that are increasingly popular among children and teens
who want to dress up as zombies, that are now on sale on-line and at many
retail stores” (quoting Rebecca Seawright)).
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as corneal tears, leading to years of medical treatment,
surgeries, and for some, permanent damage to their vision.2 A
common theme is that the injured consumers believed that the
lenses were safe because they believed that the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) had evaluated the lenses.3
In many ways, this belief makes sense. Notwithstanding
the fact that costume lenses have no therapeutic value—they do
not correct sight or address disease in any way—they pose the
same risks as contact lenses that correct the wearer’s vision and
that are commonly understood to be devices subject to FDA
oversight.4 Indeed, the FDA does regulate all contact lenses,
regardless of whether they are corrective or decorative, as
devices that require premarket authorization from the agency.5
Decorative contact lenses, thus, help to illustrate the reach
of FDA authority. Although discussions of FDA regulation of
drugs and devices often—and, particularly amid the COVID-19
pandemic, understandably—focus on the agency’s oversight of

2. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 1 (“Gaye was lucky. In most cases, an
infection from a scraped cornea requires a corneal transplant in order to
restore vision. In some extreme cases, permanent blindness can occur.”).
3. See id. (stating that many people buy such lenses from gas stations
and costume shops that sell them illegally).
4. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, FDA STAFF,
EYE CARE PROFESSIONALS, AND CONSUMERS: DECORATIVE, NON-CORRECTIVE
CONTACT LENSES 2 (2006), https://perma.cc/C2P5-PRKP (PDF) [hereinafter
DECORATIVE LENSES GUIDANCE].
5. See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(n) (“All contact lenses shall be deemed to be
devices . . . .”); DECORATIVE LENSES GUIDANCE, supra note 4, at 3 (“Although
FDA had taken the position that contact lenses intended solely for decorative
use may be regulated as cosmetics under section 201(i) of the Act, enactment
of section 520(n) requires that all contact lenses be regulated as devices.”).
Many of the news reports of injuries, however, appear to have involved
decorative lenses that did not go through the required FDA premarket
authorization process and were sold illegally without a prescription. See, e.g.,
Williams, supra note 1. For a fuller discussion of how the FDA came to
regulate all contact lenses, see infra Part II.B.
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important therapies,6 the FDA’s jurisdiction also can extend to
non-therapeutic uses of drugs and devices.7
This is generally because the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act8 (FDCA) broadly defines “drugs”9 and “devices” to
include not only products intended to address disease, but also
products “intended to affect the structure or any function of the
body.”10 Consistent with this statutory language, the FDA’s
drug and device authorities have been applied to a wide range
of non-therapeutic technologies including products intended to
enhance the cognitive or athletic performance of healthy
individuals, breast implants for aesthetic augmentation, and

6. For example, the long-standing debate about terminally and seriously
ill patients’ pre-approval access to experimental interventions focuses not just
on the FDA’s role in regulating therapeutic products, but on that role in the
context of therapeutic products intended for very sick patients who lack good
treatment options. See, e.g., Lewis A. Grossman, AIDS Activists, FDA
Regulation, and the Amendment of America’s Drug Constitution, 42 AM. J.L. &
MED. 687, 721 (2016); cf. Barbara J. Evans & Ellen Wright Clayton, Deadly
Delay: The FDA’s Role in America’s Covid-Testing Debacle, 130 YALE L.J.F. 78,
7879 (2020) (analyzing the FDA’s role in regulating COVID-19 testing).
7. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Dresser, Wendy E. Wagner & Paul C. Giannelli,
Breast Implants Revisited: Beyond Science on Trial, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 705, 709
(noting that “in roughly 80 percent of cases” silicone breast implants are used
solely for aesthetic purposes).
8. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat.
1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301399i).
9. Certain products that are drugs under the FDCA—including
vaccines, viruses, proteins, therapeutic serums, and analogous products—also
meet the definition of a “biological product” under the Public Health Service
Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(i); Public Health Services Act, Pub. L. No. 78410, 58
Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201300mm-61). For
example, gene therapies are both biological products and drugs. Although
biological drug products and traditional small molecule drugs can pose
different regulatory problems, the differences are not relevant for this Article,
and, importantly, the FDA generally expects both kinds of products to satisfy
the same “safe and effective” standard for premarket authorization. See 42
U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(C); FDA 101: Regulating Biological Products, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://perma.cc/N2XJ-GVJT (PDF) (last updated July 25,
2008). For simplicity, therefore, this Article uses the term “drug” to include
both traditional small molecule drugs and biological products, focusing its
discussion on the language in the FDCA.
10. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(h).
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drugs intended for recreational use.11 At the same time, the
expansive language of the drug and device definitions in the
FDCA poses a line-drawing problem. As Justice Breyer wrote in
his dissenting opinion in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corporation,12 if the text of the definitions were “taken literally,”
the FDA could be authorized to regulate many everyday
consumer products that are intended to affect the structure or
function of the body, “includ[ing] everything from room air
conditioners to thermal pajamas.”13
Almost certainly, there is widespread agreement that the
FDA cannot, and should not, regulate products like thermal
pajamas.14 But the question remains of where the precise
boundaries of the drug and device definitions lie, and that
question may become increasingly important as new, or newly
legal, markets of non-therapeutic products, such as adult-use
cannabis, emerge and potentially intersect with FDA
jurisdiction.15 At times, Congress has stepped in to answer such
11. See, e.g., United States v. Travia, 180 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119 (D.D.C.
2001); Warning Letter from Michael Dutcher, Dir., FDA Minneapolis Dist., to
Timothy Meyer, ALV Supplement Direct (Mar. 3, 2016), https://perma.cc
/KFU6-SSGG; Regulatory History of Breast Implants in the U.S., U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/5E99-GVZM (PDF).
12. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
13. Id. at 168 (Breyer, J., dissenting); cf. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 56 (2012) (“The
words of a governing text are of paramount concern . . . .”).
14. Cf. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 168 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“[It] may well be right that the statute should not be read to cover
room air conditioners and winter underwear.”). But cf. Lars Noah, Time to Bite
the Bullet?: How an Emboldened FDA Could Take Aim at the Firearms
Industry, 53 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2021) (manuscript at i) ([T]he
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) could try to use its ‘device’
authority to rein in companies that manufacture firearms”).
15. See, e.g., Sam Kamin, Legal Cannabis in the U.S.: Not Whether but
How?, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 617, 623 (2016) (describing states’ adult-use
cannabis initiatives); see also NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., HUMAN
GENOME EDITING: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND GOVERNANCE 137 (2017) (describing
the potential enhancement uses of genome editing technologies); Antonio
Regalado, Elon Musk’s Neuralink Is Neuroscience Theater, MIT TECH. REV.
(Aug. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/TYS7-6LA4 (quoting Elon Musk as
describing the neurotechnology being developed by his company, Neuralink,
as a “Fitbit in your skull”); cf. Alexis Lazzeri, California Cannabis Regulations
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definitional questions by amending the FDCA for specific
technologies, as it did in 2005 when it specified that all contact
lenses, whether decorative or corrective, are devices.16 In many
instances, however, the agency and courts are left to determine
the boundaries of the definitions. One argument that has been
a powerful tool for limiting the reach of the definitions—
including in the Supreme Court majority opinion’s analysis of
FDA authority to regulate tobacco products as drug-delivery
devices in Brown & Williamson—is that the FDA cannot
regulate certain non-therapeutic technologies as drugs and
devices because it would be impossible for those technologies to
meet the FDCA’s safety and effectiveness standards for
premarket authorization.17
This Article calls for skepticism about, if not the demise of,
that line of reasoning for at least two reasons. First, for better
or worse,18 the FDA currently possesses, and has exercised,
tremendous flexibility in how it interprets and implements its
premarket authorization authorities. Consistent with this
flexibility, a careful review of past FDA actions on
non-therapeutic uses of drugs and devices reveals that FDA
premarket authorization processes are not an insurmountable

and the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act: A Product Liability Perspective of
Edible Cannabis, 16 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 65, 7374 (2020) (arguing that FDA
could regulate cannabis edibles, whether intended for medical or adult use,
under its food authorities).
16. See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(n); DECORATIVE LENSES GUIDANCE, supra note 4,
at 3.
17. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 143; see also
Whether the Food and Drug Administration Has Jurisdiction over Articles
Intended for Use in Lawful Executions, 43 Op. O.L.C. 1, 12 (2019)
[hereinafter 2019 OLC Memo], https://perma.cc/HU3J-ZW83 (concluding that
substances used in executions are within FDA jurisdiction partly because FDA
regulation “would effectively require their prohibition”). For the statutory
standards related to safety and effectiveness, see, for example, 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(d); id. § 360c(f)(2); id. § 360c(i); id. § 360e(d); 42 U.S.C. § 262(a).
18. Cf. Joshua D. Wallach, Joseph S. Ross & Huseyin Naci, The US Food
and Drug Administration’s Expedited Approval Programs: Evidentiary
Standards, Regulatory Trade-offs, and Potential Improvements, 15 CLINICAL
TRIALS 219, 220 (2018) (assessing potential problems with “flexible approval
standards”).
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obstacle to marketing.19 Returning to the example of decorative
contact lenses, they, like corrective lenses, are associated with
serious (albeit relatively rare) risks like blindness, and
transient, purely aesthetic, and undoubtedly to some, trivial,
benefits.20 Nevertheless, they have received FDA authorization.
Second, considering the purposes of FDA premarket
authorization, including both protecting the public from
harmful or ineffective products and forcing the development of
information needed to understand the effects of drugs and
devices,21 the conclusion that the FDA cannot determine
19. See infra Part III.B.
20. See DECORATIVE LENSES GUIDANCE, supra note 4, at 2 (enumerating
the risks of decorative lenses including blindness, infection, corneal scarring,
and even loss of the eye).
21. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MEMORANDUM: PUBLIC HEALTH
INTERESTS AND FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO
MANUFACTURER COMMUNICATIONS REGARDING UNAPPROVED USES OF APPROVED
OR CLEARED MEDICAL PRODUCTS 410 (Jan. 2017) [hereinafter FDA MEMO],
https://perma.cc/7S8E-JCYP (describing various ways FDA authorities
advance public health); DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER:
ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 16
(2010) (“[F]ederal regulation prevents and deters many sub-par and unsafe
therapies from entering the American health-care system.”); Daniel Carpenter
et al., Approval Regulation and Endogenous Consumer Confidence: Theory
and Analogies to Licensing, Safety, and Financial Regulation, 4 REGUL. &
GOVERNANCE 383, 400 (2010) (“Approval regulation leads to a superior
distribution of products, . . . the provision of more information, and
information of a higher quality . . . .”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the
FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 345, 347 (2007)
(emphasizing the “important structural role that drug regulation has come to
play in promoting a valuable form of pharmaceutical innovation . . . .”)
[hereinafter Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy]; Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717,
719–20 (2005) (asserting that the FDA motivates investment in clinical
trialsleading to greater information regarding a given drug and its
effectsis by requiring trials for approval); Amy Kapczynski, Dangerous
Times: The FDA’s Role in Information Production, Past and Future, 102 MINN.
L. REV. 2357, 2358 (2018) (“The core function of the FDA as a drug
regulator . . . is not to make choices for the public, or to certify the truth, but
to generate and validate information about medicines.”); Christopher
Robertson & Victor Laurion, Tip of the Iceberg II: How the Intended-Uses
Principle Produces Medical Knowledge and Protects Liberty, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 770, 774 (2017) (“By putting the burden of proof on drug and device
makers who typically hold patents, and thus can reap the profits from proven

THE FDA’S POWER

387

non-therapeutic uses to be safe and effective may not be
required as a normative matter. For example, the FDA
reasonably could view consumers—who voluntarily elect to use
products for non-therapeutic purposes—as in need of less
protection than patients, who may be de facto forced to use a
drug or device by their disease or condition.22 Such a view may
justify a flexible approach to weighing a non-therapeutic
product’s benefits and risks.23 To be clear, this is not to say that
the FDA will, or must, conclude that all non-therapeutic uses
are safe and effective (or that all non-therapeutic technologies
fall within its jurisdiction).24 Rather, this Article argues that the
FDCA does not preclude the agency from evaluating the safety
and effectiveness of specific non-therapeutic uses, just as it
evaluates therapeutic ones, without necessarily banning entire
categories of technologies.
To develop the Article’s arguments, Part I first describes
what this Article means by the term “non-therapeutic use,” and
how such uses could fall within the drug and device definitions.
Part II examines some boundaries on the expansive drug and
device definitions, and explains why the argument that
non-therapeutic uses could never be judged safe and effective
may be a tempting tool to limit FDA jurisdiction. Part III
explains the flexibility that the FDCA gives the agency to
determine when a use is safe effective. It then considers the
uses, [the FDCA] regulatory regime produces knowledge which was not
produced in the unregulated market that preceded it.”).
22. Cf. Patricia J. Zettler, What Lies Ahead for FDA Regulation of tDCS
Products?, 3 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 318, 322 (2016) [hereinafter What Lies Ahead]
(“[W]e might think that individuals who are sick deserve special protection
from unproven or risky products and, therefore, less favorable or less certain
risk-benefit profiles are acceptable for enhancement products that consumers
voluntarily decide to use.”); Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r Food & Drugs, U.S. Food
& Drug Admin., Speech at America’s Health Insurance Plans’ National Health
Policy Conference: Capturing the Benefits of Competition for Patients (Mar.
7, 2018), https://perma.cc/BQ22-FSY7 (“Is a patient really in a position to
make an economically-based decision? . . . Of course not.”).
23. See infra notes 235238 and accompanying text.
24. But see Maxwell J. Mehlman, How Will We Regulate Genetic
Enhancement?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 701 (1999) (arguing that the
FDA’s assessment of the safety and effectiveness of non-therapeutic
technologies “would be compromised by the data deficiencies and subjectivity
of judgments about risk and benefit”).
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FDA’s history of assessing the risks and benefits of
non-therapeutic uses of drugs and devices, demonstrating that
the agency’s premarket review, as a descriptive matter, has not
been an insurmountable obstacle. Finally, Part IV begins to
examine how the FDCA’s safety and effectiveness standard
should be applied to non-therapeutic uses, in light of the
purposes that FDA premarket review of safety and effectiveness
is thought to serve. At a time when new, or newly legal,
non-therapeutic technologies may be poised to emerge, better
understanding of the potential scope of FDA jurisdiction is
critical to anticipating the regulatory landscape for such
technologies.
I.

NON-THERAPEUTIC USES AND THE DRUG AND DEVICE
DEFINITIONS

The line between therapeutic, and non-therapeutic
technologies, is, as numerous scholars have noted, difficult to
draw.25 Moreover, the FDA does not formally distinguish
between therapeutic and non-therapeutic uses of products that
meet the definition of a drug or device—a drug is a drug, and a
device is a device, whether or not its purpose is therapeutic. The
FDA generally has jurisdiction over any product that falls
within these definitions.26 This Part, thus, starts by describing
25. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Direct Brain Interventions to Treat
Disfavored Human Behaviors: Ethical and Social Issues, 91 CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 163, 163 (2012) (“Behaviors do not come
naturally labeled as ‘disease’ and ‘nondisease;’ humans make those
distinctions, and . . . we regularly change them . . . .”); Matt Lamkin,
Legitimate Medicine in the Age of Consumerism, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 385,
421 (2019) [hereinafter Legitimate Medicine] (describing “the blurring line
between medical and recreational [drug] use”).
26. To be within the FDA’s jurisdiction, a product both must meet the
definition of a drug or device and it (or one of its components) must move in
interstate commerce. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1); id. § 321(h); id. § 331.
However, because modern supply chains and production processes generally
involve at least one component of a product crossing state or national
boundaries, this latter limitation on the FDA’s jurisdiction is rarely relevant.
Cf. United States v. Regenerative Scis., LLC, 741 F.3d 1314, 1320 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (finding the required intersection with interstate commerce for an
autologous stem cell intervention); Memorandum from Robert Charrow, Gen.
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what this Article means by the term “non-therapeutic use” of a
drug or device, in the absence of an FDA definition. It then
explains how such non-therapeutic uses can fit within the
FDCA’s drug and device definitions.
A.

Defining ‘Non-Therapeutic Uses’

To start, this Article generally uses the term
non-therapeutic use, rather than non-therapeutic product,
because the FDA’s regulatory scheme addresses specific uses of
products.27 Regardless of a drug or device’s route through the

Couns., Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs. to Stephen Hahn, Comm’r Food & Drugs
7 (June 22, 2020) [hereinafter LDT Memo], https://perma.cc/5UTK-L7AV
(PDF) (explaining the interstate commerce requirement for devices in the
FDCA). Jurisdictional debates also arise over whether a particular
intervention—for example, a stem cell intervention—involves a product
regulated by the FDA or is, instead, a part of medical practice, typically
thought to be regulated by the states. See Regenerative Scis., 741 F.3d at
131920. As I have argued elsewhere, the product-practice distinction,
however, is blurry and may not be useful for determining the scope of the
FDA’s jurisdiction. See Patricia J. Zettler, Pharmaceutical Federalism, 92 IND.
L.J. 845, 892 (2017); see also Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to
Federalism in Controlling the Practice of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 173
(2004) (“Given its power to prevent the sale of drugs and medical devices until
persuaded of their safety and effectiveness, the FDA undoubtedly affects the
practice of medicine, even if only indirectly.”); Barbara J. Evans,
Distinguishing Product and Practice Regulation in Personalized Medicine, 81
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 288, 288 (2007) (“[P]reserving the
crucial distinction between product and practice regulation, may require
innovative regulatory approaches”); Margaret Foster Riley, An Unfulfilled
Promise: Changes Needed to the Drug Approval Process to Make Personalized
Medicine a Reality, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 289, 308 (2015) (“In 2007, FDAAA
introduced potentially far-reaching limits on the practice of medicine doctrine
allowing FDA to impose restrictions (e.g. place and mode of use) on approved
drugs . . . .”); Myrisha S. Lewis, How Subterranean Regulation Hinders
Innovation in Assisted Reproductive Technology, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1239,
1265 (2018) (“In light of the blurring distinctions between medical devices,
human tissues, drugs, and the practice of medicine, if the FDA does have
jurisdiction over advanced assisted reproductive technologies, it should clearly
explain the source of that jurisdiction . . . .”); Myrisha S. Lewis, Innovating
Federalism in the Life Sciences, 92 TEMP. L. REV. 383, 391 (2020) (explaining
that the line between medical practice and medical products “has been
‘blurring’ over time”).
27. See, e.g., FDA MEMO, supra note 21, at 1.
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FDA’s premarket review processes, an FDA authorization
decision is specific to the product’s intended use.28 That is, the
FDA does not assess a product’s safety and effectiveness as a
general matter. Rather it assesses the benefits and risks for the
specific use described in the product’s proposed labeling.
Accordingly, the FDA might judge the exact same product to be
safe and effective for one use but not for another. For example,
in 2004 the FDA approved the drug Avastin (bevacizumab) for
treating colon cancer, and then in subsequent years for use in
breast, lung, kidney, and brain cancers as well.29 In 2011, the
FDA withdrew its approval of Avastin for use in metastatic
breast cancer after determining the drug had not been
demonstrated safe and effective for that one use.30 The drug,
however, remains approved for the other uses, for which, in the
FDA’s view, there continues to be evidence that the drug’s
benefits outweigh its risks.31
Perhaps more relevant, however, is the question of what
this Article means by “non-therapeutic.” Although some of the
limits on the FDA’s drug or device jurisdiction implicate the line
between therapeutic and non-therapeutic uses of products, the
FDA has not formally explained—such as through guidance or
a regulation—the agency’s thinking about what constitutes a
therapeutic or a non-therapeutic use of a drug or device.32 In the
28. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d); id. § 360c(f)(2); id. § 360c(i); id. § 360e(d); 42
U.S.C. § 262(a); see also FDA MEMO, supra note 21, at 1 (describing the reasons
for evaluating a product for a particular use).
29. See, e.g., Summary Review for Regulatory Action: Avastin, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 14, 2014), https://perma.cc/VKV3-4CGU (PDF).
30. See Avastin (bevacizumab) Information, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Feb. 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/G5DG-VVRS.
31. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., AVASTIN LABELING (2020), https://
perma.cc/43HW-D2YU (PDF).
32. For example, the FDA has declined to consider some device-like
products that lack a medical purpose—such as certain exercise equipment—
to be devices. See 21 C.F.R. § 890.5350 (2020); see also Physical Medicine
Devices; General Provisions and Classification of 82 Devices, 48 Fed. Reg.
53,032, 53,035 (Nov. 23, 1983) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 890) (“FDA has
changed the regulations classifying many physical medicine devices to clarify
that the regulations apply only to those products intended for medical
purposes.”). As another example, an agency regulation explains what
constitutes a claim that a product affects the structure or function of the body
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absence of an FDA definition and consistent with the
literature,33 this Article uses the term “non-therapeutic use” to
describe aesthetic, enhancing, or recreational uses of drugs and
devices, rather than health-maintenance or disease-addressing
uses.34
More specifically, aesthetic uses are those intended to alter
a person’s appearance in some way that affects the structure or
function of the body, for example injecting human skin with a
fluorescent protein from jellyfish to make the skin glow.35
Enhancing uses are those intended to improve a healthy
person’s physical or mental performance to a level beyond what
is typical for them or beyond the statistically normal range for
humans.36 For instance, students who use stimulants in an
versus a claim that a product addresses disease—because the line between
such claims is critical to appropriately classifying certain products as either
dietary supplements or drugs under the FDCA. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.93 (2020).
But the line between a product use that is intended to affect the structure or
function of the body and one that is intended to address disease is not
necessarily the same as the line between a therapeutic and non-therapeutic
use of that product. Some structure/function uses may be therapeutic. For
example, “maintains healthy lung function” is a claim that a product is
intended to affect the structure or function of the body, but such a claim also
seems to have health-related implications—even if related to maintaining
health rather than treating a deficit. Regulations on Statements Made for
Dietary Supplements Concerning the Effect of the Product on the Structure or
Function of the Body, 65 Fed. Reg. 1,000, 1,018 (Jan. 6, 2000) (to be codified
at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101). See infra Part II.B for further discussion of this point.
33. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely et al., Towards Responsible Use of
Cognitive-Enhancing Drugs by the Healthy, 456 NATURE 702, 703 (2008).
34. Cf. Christi J. Guerrini et al., DIY CRISPR, 97 N.C. L. REV. 1399, 1413
(2019) (describing similar categories).
35. See Kristen V. Brown, Genetically Engineering Yourself Sounds Like
a Horrible Idea—But This Guy Is Doing It Anyway, GIZMODO (Nov. 29, 2017,
10:00 AM), https://perma.cc/82R5-TQQB (describing a biohacker’s attempt to
make his skin glow).
36. See, e.g., 2 PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL
ISSUES, GRAY MATTERS: TOPICS AT THE INTERSECTION OF NEUROSCIENCE,
ETHICS, AND SOCIETY 28 (2015) [hereinafter GRAY MATTERS], https://perma.cc
/33MA-36HW; see also Henry T. Greely, Remarks on Human Biological
Enhancement, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1139, 1140 (2008) (“[Enhancement] is using
things not only to repair or bring up the human norm, but also to surpass
either the preexisting position or to go to the extremeto move outside the
normal human range.”); Dov Fox, Safety, Efficacy, and Authenticity: The Gap
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effort to improve their academic performance are often
described as using drugs for cognitive enhancement.37
Recreational uses are those uses of drugs and devices that are,
perhaps most simply, not for therapeutic, aesthetic, or
enhancing purposes.38 Inhaling nitrous oxide for a high, for
instance, would be a recreational or adult use.39
Of course, where to draw the line between an aesthetic,
enhancing, recreational, or therapeutic use is not always, and
perhaps is only rarely, clear.40 For example, a leading advocate
for legalizing medical uses of cannabis famously asserted that
“all [adult] marijuana use is medical”—on the ground that
“stress relief is a medical purpose, [so] any adult who uses
cannabis does so for medical reasons.”41 As another example,
people who use attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)
Between Ethics and Law in FDA Decisionmaking, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1135,
113738 (“Enhancements are distinct from other biomedical products in that
they are put to uses which extend beyond the goal of preventing disease,
repairing disability, and restoring physiological wholeness.”); cf. Efthimios
Parasidis, Human Enhancement and Experimental Research in the Military,
44 CONN. L. REV. 1117, 1129 (2012) (explaining that the military has “sought
to leverage innovative medical products and technologies . . . to make the
individual warfighter stronger, more alert, more endurant, and better able to
heal” (internal quotations omitted)).
37. See Greely et al., supra note 33, at 702; see also Legitimate Medicine,
supra note 25, at 422 (discussing the difficulty of distinguishing medical and
enhancing uses of certain drugs).
38. Cf. Kamin, supra note 15, at 62324 (“Recreational laws short-circuit
the entire rubric of the [Controlled Substances Act] framework, treating
marijuana not as a controlled substance at all, but as something more akin to
alcohol or tobacco.”).
39. See, e.g., Aaron Rowe, Chem Lab: The Downside of Getting High on
Nitrous Oxide, WIRED (Dec. 9, 2007, 9:49 PM), https://perma.cc/64NC-NCL8.
40. See, e.g., GRAY MATTERS, supra note 36, at 2829 (“Drawing clear lines
between maintaining or improving function within normal ranges on one hand
and expanding or augmenting on the other, or between treating as therapy on
one hand and expanding or augmenting as enhancement on the other, can be
difficult in both theory and practice.”); Legitimate Medicine, supra note 25, at
387 (describing the “[c]ommon . . . confusion regarding the scope of legitimate
medicine and the nature of drug abuse” that permeates controversies over use
of various drugs).
41. Lewis A. Grossman, Life, Liberty, [and the Pursuit of Happiness]:
Medical Marijuana Regulation in Historical Context, 74 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
280, 28283 (2019) (quoting Dennis Peron).
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drugs to enhance their cognitive performance describe their
reasons for doing so similarly to how patients who are
prescribed drugs to treat their ADHD describe their reasons for
use.42 Partly for this reason, Matt Lamkin has argued that such
enhancing uses are distinguishable from therapeutic uses only
“by whether the user has a prescription for the drug.”43
Not only is the distinction between therapeutic and
non-therapeutic uses a conceptually hazy one, but the
pharmaceutical and device industries also have long been
criticized for proactively muddying the distinction to help sell
their products.44 Critics argue that some industry advertising
and promotion efforts medicalize the discomforts of ordinary life
to sell more products—such as a disease awareness campaign
that seeks to persuade consumers that particular symptoms
might constitute the treatable condition of “overactive
bladder.”45 Similarly, certain business models may blur the line
between therapeutic and non-therapeutic uses, as with at-home
teeth aligners that are marketed as providing aesthetic
improvements to users’ smiles but also as products that may be
eligible for dental insurance coverage.46
Questions about what counts as therapeutic and
non-therapeutic uses—and how the distinction between the two
might be manipulated—are important. But they are not the
focus of this Article. Instead, this Article aims to consider the
FDA’s jurisdiction over non-therapeutic uses of drugs and
devices, whatever may fall into that “non-therapeutic” category.
For that reason, this Article focuses on examples of drug and
device uses that are generally, albeit not always, agreed to be
non-therapeutic, such as the use of Botox (onabotulinumtoxinA)
42. See Legitimate Medicine, supra note 25, at 42123.
43. Id. at 422.
44. See, e.g., Ray Moynihan et al., Selling Sickness: The Pharmaceutical
Industry and Disease Mongering, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 886, 887 (2002).
45. See, e.g., id. at 889.
46. See, e.g., SMILE DIRECT CLUB, https://perma.cc/KL53-MCPV; cf. Anna
Wexler et al., Direct-to-Consumer Orthodontics: Surveying User Experience,
151 J. AM. DENTAL ASSOC. 625, 634 (2020) (describing consumers as having
both aesthetic and oral-health-related reasons for seeking at-home teeth
aligners).
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to reduce facial wrinkles, the use of decorative contact lenses to
change the appearance of the users’ eyes, and the recreational
use of substances. Such uses of drugs and devices, also, notably,
are not generally covered by health insurance plans, which
typically reimburse for “medically necessary” services.47
B.

The Expansive Text of the Statutory Definitions

However precisely defined, non-therapeutic uses can fall
within the FDA’s drug and device jurisdiction. The FDCA
defines drugs and devices as including articles “intended for use
in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease” and those “intended to affect the structure or any
function of the body.”48 It is this latter part of the definition that
generally has enabled the FDA to assert that non-therapeutic
uses fall within its drug and device authorities.
Given this statutory language, the key for determining
whether an “article” is a drug or a device is typically its
“intended use.”49 FDA regulations define intended use as the
“objective intent of the persons legally responsible for the
labeling,” which is usually a product’s manufacturer or seller.50
47. “Medically necessary” is broad enough to include uses of drugs and
devices that are health-related, but not disease-focused—such as pregnancy
tests performed in a physician’s office or oral contraceptives. See, e.g., EEOC
v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1219 (D. Minn. 2001).
However, “medically necessary” is not so broad as to typically include
aesthetic, enhancing, or recreational uses of drugs and devices. See, e.g., id. at
1219 n.2.
48. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1); see id. § 321(h) (defining “device”). Devices are
distinguished from drugs largely by the kinds of items that they are—items
that do not “achieve [their] primary intended purpose through chemical action
within or on the body . . . and . . . [are] not dependent on being metabolized” to
achieve that purpose. Id. § 321(h); Genus Med. Techs., LLC v. FDA, 427 F.
Supp. 3d 74, 77 (D.D.C. 2019) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)). Additionally, devices,
unlike drugs, include articles intended for use in the diagnosis of “conditions.”
21 U.S.C § 321(h); Shelby Baird, Note, Don’t Try This at Home: The FDA’s
Restrictive Regulation of Home-Testing Devices, 67 DUKE L.J. 383, 393 (2017).
This aspect of the device definition captures diagnostic tools that are not
focused on diseases, but are nevertheless important, such as pregnancy tests.
See 21 C.F.R. § 862.1155(a)(1) (2020).
49. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.128, 801.4 (2020).
50. Id. § 201.128.
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Typically the requisite intended use is evinced by a
manufacturer or seller’s public statements suggesting, explicitly
or implicitly, that a product is intended to address disease
(“disease claims”) or to affect the structure or function of the
body (“structure/function claims”).51 For example, a
manufacturer might state in its drug labeling that the product
is “indicated for the treatment of metastatic colorectal cancer,”
which would be a disease claim.52 As another example, a
manufacturer might market a brain stimulation device for
“increased [athletic] stamina and endurance,”53 or as a way to
“charge your mind,” which would be explicit or implicit
structure/function claims.54
Consistent with these broad definitions, the FDA has
asserted jurisdiction over a potentially surprising range of
products. These include products commonly understood to be
FDA-regulated drugs and devices, such as products marketed as
cancer or COVID-19 therapies.55 These also include some
products that may not be commonly understood to fall within
the FDA’s drug and device authorities, such as antiperspirant,56
epilators that remove hair,57 and products intended to produce
a “chill” similar to that produced by cannabis.58
Further underscoring the expansiveness of the definitions
is that a manufacturer or seller’s public claims about its
products are not the only source of evidence for ascertaining

51. See, e.g., id. § 101.93.
52. AVASTIN LABELING, supra note 31.
53. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Warning Letter to Big Dan’s Fitness and
Nutrition, LLC (May 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/4Z8A-UMXV (identifying
“increased stamina and endurance” as a structure/function claim).
54. What Lies Ahead, supra note 22, at 318.
55. See AVASTIN LABELING, supra note 31; COVID-19: An Update on the
Federal Response: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Lab. &
Pensions, 116th Cong. 6 (2020).
56. See, e.g., PETER HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 117 (4th ed. 2013).
57. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 878.5350, 878.5360 (2020).
58. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Warning Letter to Green Planet Inc.
(Dec. 5, 2013), https://perma.cc/4VB8-8QDF.
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intended use.59 Courts have opined that the agency may
consider “any relevant source” of evidence of intended use.60 As
recently as September 2020, in a rule proposing changes to the
regulatory definition of intended use, the agency reaffirmed its
own view that it may consider “any relevant source of evidence”
to determine a product’s intended use.61 A product’s design,62
internal company statements,63 statements that a company
previously made but no longer makes,64 and the overall

59. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.128, 801.4 (2020). For additional discussion of
the kinds of evidence that may show a product’s intended use, see Patricia J.
Zettler, et al., Closing the Regulatory Gap for Synthetic Nicotine Products, 59
B.C. L. REV. 1933, 195667 (2018).
60. See, e.g., Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 334
(2d Cir. 1977); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120, 143 (2000) (rejecting the FDA’s attempt to regulate tobacco products as
drugs and devices, without disagreeing with the argument that the tobacco
products’ design was evidence of their intended use).
61. Regulations Regarding “Intended Uses,” 85 Fed. Reg. 59,718, 59,721
(proposed Sept. 23, 2020) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 801).
62. See, e.g., Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Is a Drug and
These Products Are Nicotine Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act: Jurisdictional Determination, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619,
44,636– 37 (Aug. 28, 1996) (relying on product design as evidence of intended
use); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Warning Letter to Salton, Inc. (Aug. 20, 2006),
https://perma.cc/327S-2YE3 [hereinafter Rejuvenique Warning Letter]
(relying on the Rejuvenique product design as evidence of intended use).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Vascular Sols., Inc., 181 F. Supp. 3d 342,
347 (W.D. Tex. 2016) (permitting the use of non-public statements as evidence
of intended use).
64. See, e.g., United States v. 789 Cases, More or Less, of Latex Surgeons’
Gloves, an Article of Device, 799 F. Supp. 1275, 1285 (D.P.R. 1992) (“[A]
manufacturer . . . cannot avoid the reaches of the [FDCA] by stating that the
product has a different—and non-regulated use. The Courts have recognized
the ‘carry-over effect’ that is created by a manufacturer’s original
representations about the product.”); United States v. Undetermined
Quantities of an Article of Drug Labeled as “Exachol”, 716 F. Supp. 787, 791
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“Courts have recognized that where years later customers
purchase a product in reliance on the therapeutic claims of the previous
literature marketed with that product, the court may use such literature to
determine the intent in marketing the product despite a later disclaimer.”);
see also Allergan, Inc. v. Athena Cosms., Inc., 738 F.3d 1350, 1356–57 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (concluding that a company’s past claims that its product affected
the structure of eyelashes were relevant to an intended use analysis because
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environment in which a product is distributed65 are all among
the other kinds of evidence on which the FDA has relied to
demonstrate the requisite intended use.66 For instance, the FDA
has taken the position that a machine designed to use electrical
current to contract facial muscles, in order to tighten skin and
reduce wrinkles, is a device “even if no claims were made for its
specific use.”67 In other words, a company cannot necessarily
avoid its product being regulated as a drug or device solely by
avoiding both disease and structure/function claims.
II.

FINDING BOUNDARIES FOR THE DEFINITIONS

Although broad, the drug and device definitions are not
limitless. Through the statutory structure of the FDCA or even
through
statutory
amendments
addressing
specific
technologies, Congress has placed boundaries on the scope of the
drug and device definitions.68 Likewise, courts and the FDA
have sought to interpret the statute in ways that draw
reasonable boundaries around the expansive definitions.69 This
section explores various boundaries on the drug and device
definitions, and suggests that, for at least some emerging
non-therapeutic uses, there is no clear limit on the FDA’s ability
to regulate them as drugs and devices70 —leaving the door open
the company did not materially alter its product’s formulation or disavow its
previous claims).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Storage Spaces Designated Nos. 8 & 49, 777
F.2d 1363, 1366 n.5 (9th Cir. 1985) (concluding that the “overall
circumstances” showed that products labeled as incense were drugs); United
States v. Travia, 180 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119 (D.D.C. 2001) (concluding that
unlabeled nitrous oxide sold outside a rock concert was a drug because the
“environment provided the necessary information between buyer and seller”).
66. But see Sean M. O’Connor & Erika Lietzan, The Surprising Reach of
FDA Regulation of Cannabis, Even After Descheduling, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 823,
903 (2019) (expressing skepticism about the FDA relying on these kinds of
evidence of intended use).
67. Rejuvenique Warning Letter, supra note 62.
68. See infra Part II.A–B.
69. See infra Part II.C–E.
70. Cf. O’Connor & Lietzan, supra note 66, at 903 (arguing that the FDA
asserting jurisdiction over recreational uses of cannabis products would be
controversial).
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to arguments that FDA cannot do so because the uses could
never be judged safe and effective.
A. Other Product Definitions
One clear way that the drug and device definitions are
limited are by the FDCA’s definitions of “other products.”
Congress has placed certain kinds of non-therapeutic uses of
products—that otherwise might satisfy the drug or device
definition—outside the scope of the FDA’s drug and device
jurisdiction by creating other product categories, such as
cosmetics,71 tobacco products,72 and dietary supplements.73
Cosmetics are not intended to address disease or affect the
structure or function of the body, and instead are intended “for
cleansing,
beautifying,
promoting
attractiveness,
or
altering . . . appearance.”74 Tobacco products—products “made
or derived from tobacco” including e-cigarettes that use
tobacco-derived e-liquid—cannot be marketed to address
disease, but may be marketed as affecting the structure or
function of the body as long as the structure/function claims are
those that have been customarily made about tobacco (e.g.,
“satisfying”).75 Similarly, dietary supplements—which must
71. 21 U.S.C. § 321(i). A product can meet the definition of both a
cosmetic and a drug or device, if it is intended to both alter appearance and
affect the structure or function of the body. See Is It a Cosmetic, a Drug, or
Both? (Or Is It Soap?), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 24, 2020), https://
perma.cc/Z3S9-FLSA. In such instances of products that are a combination of
a cosmetic and a drug or device, the product is regulated according to the more
stringent drug or device rules. See id.
72. 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff). Unlike cosmetics, the FDA generally takes the
position that a product cannot meet both the definition of a dietary supplement
and of a drug or device, nor may a dietary supplement be combined with a
drug or device. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Warning Letter to Proctor
& Gamble (Oct. 29, 2009), https://perma.cc/YMR7-D7KA.
73. 21 U.S.C. § 321(rr). The FDCA specifies that a product cannot meet
both the definition of a tobacco product and of a drug or device, and that a
tobacco product may not be combined with a drug or device. See id. § 321(rr)(2),
(4).
74. Id. § 321(i).
75. See id. § 321(rr)(1); Sottera, Inc. v. FDA, 627 F.3d 891, 894 (D.C. Cir.
2010); see also Clarification of When Products Made or Derived from Tobacco
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contain a dietary ingredient, such as an herb, and cannot
contain approved or studied drug ingredients—generally may
be marketed with structure/function claims but not disease
claims.76 Cosmetics and dietary supplements are generally not
subject to FDA premarket review,77 and, although new tobacco
products are subject to premarket review, it is a different
process than that for drugs and devices.78 Through these
avenues, therefore, some (but not all) products with
non-therapeutic uses, such as a cosmetic cream intended to
reduce the appearance of, but not the actual existence of,
wrinkles or an herb intended to support muscle tone, may reach

Are Regulated as Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products; Amendments to
Regulations Regarding “Intended Uses,” 82 Fed. Reg. 2,193, 2,197–98 (Jan. 9,
2017) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 801, 1100) (noting that Soterra
stands for the proposition that “customarily marketed tobacco products were
sold without therapeutic claims and should be regulated as tobacco products
under the [FDCA]”); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
143 (2000) (concluding, before the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act of 2009 expressly granted the FDA authority to regulate tobacco
products, that the FDA did not have authority to regulate tobacco products
because they did not make claims about “therapeutic or medical benefit”);
Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(affirming the FDA’s then-decision to decline to categorize cigarettes as drugs
or devices). According to the FDA, a manufacturer’s claim that its tobacco
product is “satisfying” is an implicit structure/function claim that amounts to
a “euphemism[] for the delivery of a pharmacologically active dose of nicotine.”
Clarification of When Products Made or Derived from Tobacco Are Regulated
as Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products; Amendments to Regulations
Regarding “Intended Uses,” 82 Fed. Reg. 2,204.
76. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(A); 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.14(a)(1), 101.93 (2020);
see also Label Claims for Conventional Foods and Dietary Supplements, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/ZM4A-AAVX
(explaining that in some circumstances, claims can be made that dietary
supplements are intended to reduce the risk of disease—for example that
calcium may reduce the risk of developing osteoarthritis—without triggering
the FDA’s drug authorities).
77. See, e.g., Is It a Cosmetic, a Drug, or Both? (Or Is It Soap?), supra note
71.
78. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 387j (providing the standard for premarket
review of tobacco products), with id. § 355(d) (providing the approval standard
for drugs).
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the market without being subject to the FDA’s drug and device
requirements.79
B. Statutory Amendments for Specific Technologies
Notwithstanding these other product categories, the broad
language of the drug and device definitions generally gives the
FDA wide discretion to determine what products are subject to
drug and device requirements—discretion that the agency has
used both to decline, and to assert, jurisdiction over certain
non-therapeutic uses.80 At times, when Congress has disagreed
with the agency’s decision about its jurisdiction, it has amended
the FDCA to address whether a specific non-therapeutic
technology is a drug or device.81
The story behind how FDA came to regulate decorative
contact lenses as devices provides one example. In 2002, there
were reports that the FDA was going to decline to categorize
decorative lenses as devices.82 After learning this news, in
August 2002, then-Representative Henry Waxman wrote a
letter to then-Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy
Thompson arguing that all contact lenses are devices under the
79. See, e.g., Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements
Concerning the Effect of the Product on the Structure or Function of the Body,
65 Fed. Reg. 1,000, 1,020 (Jan. 6, 2000) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101).
80. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 126; Harris,
655 F.2d at 236.
81. Because the FDA is an agency within the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), HHS also may overrule FDA decisions on product
jurisdiction. In August 2020, HHS issued an announcement limiting the FDA’s
ability to regulate a category of diagnostic tests known as
laboratory-developed tests (LDTs). See Rescission of Guidances and Other
Informal Issuances Concerning Premarket Review of Laboratory Developed
Tests, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Aug. 19, 2020), https://perma.cc/B82T7VUK. Although LDTs may not have many, if any, non-therapeutic uses, the
LDT story provides an example of how HHS can affect the FDA’s flexibility to
determine the scope of its jurisdiction. See LDT Memo, supra note 26, at 2
(stating that HHS is deciding “under what circumstances, if any, does [the]
FDA have the jurisdiction to regulate LDTs”).
82. See Proposal to Regulate Nonprescription Contact Lenses as Cosmetics
Triggers Health Concerns, 10 NO. 12 GUIDE MED. DEVICE REG. NEWSL. 4 (2002)
(describing concerns among Congress members and eye care professionals as
a result of these reports, and the letter from Rep. Waxman).
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FDCA.83 The letter asserted that “a contact lens . . . reduces the
flow of oxygen to and carbon dioxide from the cornea, create[ing]
pressure on the underlying tissues and reduces wetting of the
ocular surface” and thus “[a]ny manufacturer . . . that intends
for users to place the products in the eye must also intend for
these [structure/function] effects to occur.”84 Nevertheless, in
2003, the FDA opined that decorative contact lenses were
cosmetics intended to beautify, and not devices, “[p]rovided they
are not marketed with claims that they effect physical or
physiological change.”85 Ultimately, because of concerns about
the risks of decorative lenses, in 2005, Congress removed the
agency’s discretion on the issue and amended the FDCA to
specify that all contact lenses are devices.86
The FDA’s attempt to regulate certain mobile medical apps
provides another example—but of Congress rejecting the
agency’s attempt to assert, rather than decline, jurisdiction. In
2013, the FDA issued a guidance document explaining its
approach to regulating mobile medical apps as devices.87
Certain members of Congress then expressed concern that FDA
oversight would stifle innovation. In 2016, Congress ultimately
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Guidance for FDA Staff on Sampling or Detention Without Physical
Examination of Decorative Contact Lenses (Import Alert #86-10); Availability,
68 Fed. Reg. 16,520, 16,521 (Apr. 4, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 Decorative Lenses
Import Alert]; see 21 U.S.C. § 321(i) (defining cosmetic). The FDA similarly
took the position that decorative lenses were cosmetics in an October 2002
Import Alert, but without explaining its reasoning. Detention Without Physical
Examination of Decorative Contact Lenses (Import Alert #86-10), U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 22, 2002), https://perma.cc/RJG9-2ENR (PDF). The agency
reportedly adopted the new position on decorative lenses following a meeting
between the agency’s then-Chief Counsel and a manufacturer of decorative
contact lenses. See Proposal to Regulate Nonprescription Contact Lenses as
Cosmetics Triggers Health Concerns, supra note 82.
86. See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(n); DECORATIVE LENSES GUIDANCE, supra note 4,
at 2; Decorative Lenses Catch Congress’s Eye, 13 NO. 11 GUIDE MED. DEVICE
REG. NEWSL. 8 (2005).
87. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POLICY FOR DEVICE SOFTWARE
FUNCTIONS AND MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS 10 (2013), https://perma.cc
/EQA3-EP7X (PDF) (describing the FDA’s regulatory approach for device
software functions).
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passed the 21st Century Cures Act, which, among other things,
amended the FDCA to exclude from the device definition
software—such as mobile apps—intended “for maintaining or
encouraging a healthy lifestyle” when “unrelated to the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, prevention, or treatment of a
disease or condition.”88 Although “maintaining or encouraging a
healthy lifestyle” may suggest that software falling into this
non-device category must have a therapeutic, health-related
purpose, the FDA has taken the position that this definition also
encompasses enhancing uses, such as products intended to
“enhance learning capacity.”89 For example, a video game meant
to improve a healthy person’s mental acuity—although intended
to affect the structure or function of the brain—is likely no
longer a device under the FDA’s jurisdiction.90 Such software is
now not just outside of the FDA’s drug and device authorities,
but is completely outside the agency’s jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, many non-therapeutic uses have not been
specifically addressed by Congress in this manner and may
remain within the drug and device definitions.
C.

Off-Label Uses

Even when a particular product does fall within the drug or
device definitions, the FDA, nevertheless, may not be tasked
with reviewing and authorizing a non-therapeutic use of that
product if the use is “off-label.” This is because, as explained in
Part I.A, the agency’s weighing of the product’s risks and
benefits, and its authorization decision, is not for a product as a
88. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3060, 130 Stat. 1033,
1130 (2016). The concerns that FDA oversight would impede innovation in the
mobile medical app industry were not necessarily justified. See, e.g., Nathan
G. Cortez et al., FDA Regulation of Mobile Health Technologies, 371 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 372, 373–75 (2014).
89. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GENERAL WELLNESS: POLICY FOR LOW RISK
DEVICES 4 (2016), https://perma.cc/Y2KF-X699 (PDF).
90. See id. at 3. Before the 21st Century Cures Act was enacted, it was
the FDA’s policy not to enforce device requirements for many such products,
meaning the law may not have changed the regulatory scheme in practice. See,
e.g., POLICY FOR DEVICE SOFTWARE FUNCTIONS AND MOBILE MEDICAL
APPLICATIONS, supra note 87, at 12.
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whole, but rather for the particular use that the manufacturer
has proposed—to address a particular disease or condition, or
have a particular effect on the body, for a specific population,
and, for drugs, at a specified dose and in a specified dosage
form.91 At the same time that the FDA authorizes a product—or
more precisely, a particular use for the product—it also
authorizes labeling that describes that use.92 Uses that the FDA
has not authorized are not described in the FDA-authorized
labeling, and thus are known as “off-label” uses.93 In this way,
the manufacturer’s intentions determine the focus of the FDA’s
premarket authorization decision for a particular product, as
well as the scope of the labeling that the FDA authorizes for the
product.
This limited scope of FDA authorization, however, usually
does not restrict how drugs and devices are actually used once
they are marketed.94 Consistent with the conventional view that
states are the primary regulators of medical practice, it has long
been the FDA’s position that health care providers generally
may prescribe or administer a legally marketed drug or device
for any use (and patients or consumers may use a legally
marketed product for any purpose), including “off-label” uses.95
91. See FDA MEMO, supra note 21, at 2–3; Nathan Cortez, The Statutory
Case Against Off-Label Promotion, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 124, 126 (2016);
Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical
Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1826 (1996).
92. See, e.g., Erika Lietzan, The Drug Innovation Paradox, 83 MO. L. REV.
39, 43 (2018); Sam F. Halabi, The Drug Repurposing Ecosystem: Intellectual
Property, Incentives, Market Exclusivity, and the Future of “New” Medicines,
20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 39 (2018).
93. See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 91, at 124.
94. See, e.g., Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs;
Prescribing for Uses Unapproved by the FDA, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503, 16,503
(proposed Aug. 15, 1972) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130).
95. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 396; FDA MEMO, supra note 21, at 3. There,
however, are instances in which off-label use is prohibited or limited by FDA
requirements (or state or Drug Enforcement Administration requirements).
For example, the FDCA prohibits off-label prescribing of Human Growth
Hormone (HGH). 21 U.S.C. § 333(e). The FDA also has the authority to require
Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) for drugs and special
controls and restrictions for devices, all of which can have the effect of limiting
health care professionals’ ability to prescribe or dispense products off-label.
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Indeed, off-label uses, including certain well-known
non-therapeutic uses, are common.96 For example, student use
of Adderall (amphetamine aspartate), Ritalin (methyphenidate
hydrochloride), and Provigil (modafinil) to improve academic
performance has long been a high-profile, and controversial,
example of performance-enhancing drug use.97 All of these
drugs, however, are approved for other, therapeutic uses—
Adderall for ADHD and narcolepsy,98 Ritalin for ADHD,99 and
Provigil for narcolepsy and other sleep disorders.100 The FDA,
therefore,
has
not
evaluated
the
well-known
performance-enhancing uses of these drugs.
At the same time that off-label uses are generally
permitted, the FDA has long interpreted the FDCA as
prohibiting manufacturers from promoting their drugs and

See, e.g., id. § 355-1; Patricia J. Zettler, The Indirect Consequences of
Expanded Off-Label Promotion, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1053, 1081 (2017)
[hereinafter Indirect Consequences].
96. See Tewodros Eguale et al., Drug, Patient, and Physician
Characteristics Associated with Off-Label Prescribing in Primary Care, 172
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 781, 781 (2012); Tewodros Eguale et al., Association
of Off-Label Drug Use and Adverse Drug Events in an Adult Population, 176
J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 55, 60 (2016).
97. See Greely et al., supra note 33, at 702; see also GRAY MATTERS, supra
note 36, at 37 (“[O]ne review of Provigil® and Ritalin® use for cognitive
enhancement states that expectations regarding the effectiveness of these
drugs exceed their actual effects.” (citations omitted)).
98. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ADDERALL LABELING, https://perma.cc
/KB4U-ZF5B (PDF) (last updated Jan. 2017).
99. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., RITALIN LABELING (Jan. 2017), https://
perma.cc/CLQ2-XTC9 (PDF).
100. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PROVIGIL LABELING, https://perma.cc
/3Z9X-HHFB (PDF) (last updated Jan. 2015). One of Provigil’s approved
indications is for excessive sleepiness associated with “shift work disorder.” Id.
at 1. Characterizing the negative circadian rhythm effects of shift work as a
disorder is an example of what some commentators have criticized as the
medicalization of the problems of ordinary life (or the medicalization of a
problem that may be best fixed through non-medical means, such as more
humane workplace policies). See, e.g., Robert Meadows et al., The Sociology of
Sleep, in SLEEP, HEALTH, AND SOCIETY: FROM AETIOLOGY TO PUBLIC HEALTH
275, 277 (Francesco P. Cappuccio et al. eds., 2010).
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devices for off-label uses.101 The FDA’s policies on off-label
promotion are controversial and have been subject to legal
challenges grounded in the First Amendment.102 But the agency
has yet to significantly change its approach to off-label
promotion (and First Amendment challenges have yet to require
the agency to do so).103 Accordingly, although off-label uses are
often not regulated by the FDA, manufacturers that wish to
promote non-therapeutic uses of their drugs and devices
generally must first obtain FDA authorization for those uses.

101. See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 91, at 130; FDA MEMO, supra note 21, at
29. The FDCA does not expressly prohibit the promotion of unauthorized uses.
Instead, the FDCA prohibits distributing in interstate commerce misbranded,
adulterated, or unauthorized new drugs and devices. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a). And,
under the FDA’s interpretation of the FDCA, when a manufacturer promotes
an FDA-authorized drug or device for an unauthorized use, that causes a drug
to be misbranded (or, in some cases, to be an unapproved new drug), and a
device to be misbranded or adulterated. See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 91, at 130.
102. For a small selection of articles on off-label promotion, see Joshua M.
Sharfstein & Alta Charo, The Promotion of Medical Products in the 21st
Century: Off-Label Marketing and First Amendment Concerns, 314 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 1795, 1796 (2015); Ralph F. Hall & Elizabeth S. Sobotka,
Inconsistent Government Policies: Why FDA Off-Label Regulation Cannot
Survive First Amendment Review Under Greater New Orleans, 62 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 1, 1 (2007); George Horvath, Off-Label Drug Risks: Toward A New
FDA Regulatory Approach, 29 ANNALS HEALTH L. & LIFE SCI. 101, 101 (2020);
Jeffrey Chasnow & Geoffrey Levitt, Off-Label Communications: The Prodigal
Returns, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 257, 257 (2018); Joan H. Krause, Truth, Falsity,
and Fraud: Off-Label Drug Settlements and the Future of the Civil False
Claims Act, 71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 401, 404 (2016); Aaron S. Kesselheim &
Michelle M. Mello, Prospects for Regulation of Off-Label Drug Promotion in an
Era of Expanding Commercial Speech Protection, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1539, 1542
(2014); David Orentlicher, Off-Label Drug Marketing, the First Amendment,
and Federalism, 50 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 89, 92 (2016); Christopher
Robertson, The Tip of the Iceberg: A First Amendment Right to Promote Drugs
Off-Label, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1019, 1020 (2017); John Kamp et al., FDA
Marketing v. First Amendment: Washington Legal Foundation Legal
Challenges to Off-Label Policies May Force Unprecedented Changes at FDA,
54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 555, 555 (1999); Indirect Consequences, supra note 95, at
1061.
103. See FDA MEMO, supra note 21, at 20.
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D.

“Medical” Use

Caselaw and the FDA’s regulatory history also provide
some possible limits on the drug and device definitions. In the
1960s and 1970s two circuit courts and one district court
concluded that structure/function claims must be “medical” in
nature to make a product—in those cases, a wrinkle cream—a
drug or device.104 Relying on these cases, the FDA also has
stated in a few instances that a product must have a “medical
application” to fall within the device definition, specifically.105
For example, the agency declined to categorize as devices
exercise equipment intended for recreational purposes as well
as implantable chips used for non-medical identification
purposes, despite the fact such products are clearly intended to
affect the structure or function of the body.106
Although requiring that drugs and devices have a “medical”
application might, on its face, seem to exclude non-therapeutic
uses from the FDA’s drug and device authorities, courts and the
104. See United States v. An Article . . . Consisting of 216 Cartoned
Bottles, More or Less, Sudden Change, 409 F.2d 734, 742 (2d Cir. 1969);
United States v. An Article Consisting of 36 Boxes, More or Less, Labeled
“Line Away Temp. Wrinkle Smoother, Coty,” 415 F.2d 369, 372 (3d Cir. 1969);
United States v. Article of Drug 47 Ship. Cartons, More or Less, “Helene Curtis
Magic Secret”, 331 F. Supp. 912, 917 (D. Md. 1971); see also Anna Wexler, A
Pragmatic Analysis of the Regulation of Consumer Transcranial Direct
Current Stimulation (tDCS) Devices in the United States, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES
669, 681 (2015) (discussing these cases).
105. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 56, at 125–28 (reprinting a 2002 letter
from the FDA’s then-Chief Counsel stating that a microminiature transponder
implant was not a device because it did not affect the body in a medical or
drug-type fashion); United States v. Undetermined No. of Unlabeled Cases, 21
F.3d 1026, 1030 (10th Cir. 1994) (Cook, J., dissenting) (“The government
concedes that it does not claim that a device which has no medical application
could qualify as a device under the FDCA.” (citations omitted)); cf. Gary E.
Gamerman, Note, Intended Use and Medical Devices: Distinguishing
Nonmedical “Devices” from Medical “Devices” Under 21 U.S.C. 321(h), 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 806, 807 (1993) (“[W]hen the manufacturer implies that the
product has medicinal properties, courts have upheld FDA jurisdiction.
Conversely, absent such representations, FDA assertion of jurisdiction has
failed.”).
106. See Physical Medicine Devices; General Provisions and Classification
of 82 Devices, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,032, 53,043 (Nov. 23, 1983) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 890); HUTT ET AL., supra note 56, at 125–28.
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agency have not consistently interpreted the drug and device
definitions so narrowly. The courts that suggested that
structure/function claims must have a “medical” connotation
also construed a wide variety of claims, including claims such as
“tighten[s] the skin,” to meet that standard—so long as the
claims were “drug-type.”107 In other cases, courts simply have
not declared that structure/function claims must have a medical
connotation to make a product a drug or device.108 Likewise,
notwithstanding its statements in the context of exercise
equipment and implantable chips, the FDA has in some
instances construed non-therapeutic uses of products to be
drugs or devices—such as injectable dermal fillers intended to
eliminate wrinkles or enhance lips, “micro-needling” machines
intended to improve the skin’s texture or tone, and products
intended for spider vein removal.109 Indeed, if it were true that
107. See Line Away, 415 F.2d at 372; Sudden Change, 409 F.2d at 742. But
see Helene Curtis Magic Secret, 331 F. Supp. at 915 (concluding that a wrinkle
cream that made claims similar to those described in Line Away was not a
drug).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Storage Spaces Designated Nos. 8 & 49, 777
F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that a product intended for use as a
cocaine substitute was a drug under the FDCA); Nutrilab, Inc. v. Schweiker,
713 F.2d 335, 339 (7th Cir. 1983) (concluding that starch blockers are drugs
because “they are intended to affect digestion in the people who take them”);
United States v. Travia, 180 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119 (D.D.C. 2001) (concluding
that nitrous oxide sold outside a rock concert was a drug); U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., Warning Letter to Arco Globus Trading LCC (Dec. 11, 2017), https://
perma.cc/W248-98NF (concluding that products marketed as producing
“euphoria” are drugs); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Warning Letter to ALV
Supplement Direct, (Mar. 3, 2016), https://perma.cc/E55L-6C2X (concluding
that products marketed as “boosting energy,” burning fat, and “increase[ing]
focus” are drugs); cf. Undetermined No. of Unlabeled Cases, 21 F.3d at 1028
(“The [device] definition does not define the term ‘diagnosis’ nor limit
diagnostic devices to those used prior to medical treatment.” (quoting 21
U.S.C. § 321(h)(2))).
109. See, e.g., Warning Letters Highlight Differences Between Cosmetics
and Medical Devices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://perma.cc/V4AC-D4RH
(last updated Sept. 11, 2020) (listing examples of products for aesthetic uses
that the FDA regulates as devices). The FDA’s seemingly contradictory
positions may result from the agency broadly construing the term “medical.”
For example, in 1993, the agency explained that it considered drugs intended
to stop the habit of nailbiting to be intended to prevent disease, because
nailbiting can make infection more likely. See Nailbiting and Thumbsucking
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products must have medical uses—narrowly construed—to
meet the definition of a device, it may not have been necessary
for Congress to remove software intended for general wellness
uses from the definition of a device, for example.110 In short, the
courts’ and the FDA’s occasional reliance on “medical” use as a
limit on the drug and device definitions is not entirely
convincing, nor has it yielded a definitive, principled answer as
to which non-therapeutic uses fall within the drug and device
definitions, and which do not.111
Deterrent Drug Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use, 58 Fed. Reg.
46,749, 46,750 (Sept. 2, 1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 310.536). It also
may be that the FDA did not accurately describe its overall policy in the
documents in which it claimed specific products without medical applications
were not devices.
110. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3060, 130 Stat.
1033, 1130 (2016).
111. The FDA’s ability to successfully assert jurisdiction over
non-therapeutic uses might not be particularly dependent on formal doctrines
of judicial deference to agencies’ interpretations of their enabling statutes and
implementing regulations. Cf. Cary Coglianese, Chevron’s Interstitial Steps,
85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1339, 1344 (2017) (describing Chevron and “the
emerging criticism of its deference principle”); Christopher J. Walker,
Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, 16 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 103, 105–18 (2018) (describing the arguments in favor of
eliminating or narrowing Chevron and Auer deference). For the FDA
specifically, courts have long deferred to the agency’s interpretations of the
FDCA. See, e.g., United States v. An Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk . . . ,
394 U.S. 784, 791–92 (1969); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 553
(1979); Premo Pharm. Lab’ys, Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 795, 803 (2d Cir.
1980); cf. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit
Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 53 (2017) (reporting that the FDA was among the
agencies to which courts most often deferred); William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of
Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083,
1120 (2008) (“[T]he Court was highly deferential to agency interpretations
before Chevron.”); Peter M. Shane, Chevron Deference, the Rule of Law, and
Presidential Influence in the Administrative State, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 679,
684
(2014)
(“[C]ommentators
were
hardly
unanimous
in . . . characteriz[ing] . . . Chevron as ‘revolutionary.’”); David Zaring,
Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 143 (2010) (“[C]ourts tend to reverse
agencies at the same rate regardless of the standard of review they
apply . . . .”). But see Genus Med. Techs., LLC v. United States Food & Drug
Admin., 427 F. Supp. 3d 74, 84 (D.D.C. 2019) (declining to defer to the FDA’s
position that the drug and device definitions are overlapping). Perhaps more
importantly given the current composition of the Supreme Court, regardless
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Other Statutory Schemes

Another ground that courts, and arguably the FDA, have used
to limit the scope of the FDA’s drug and device jurisdiction is
that certain non-therapeutic uses are regulated pursuant to
later-enacted federal statutes other than, and more specific
than, the FDCA—and thus Congress could not have intended
the FDA to regulate them.112 One example comes from the
majority opinion in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.113 In 1996, before Congress expressly granted FDA
jurisdiction over tobacco products, the FDA promulgated a rule
that asserted that nicotine was a drug, intended to affect the
structure or function of the body, and that the agency had
authority to regulate cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products
as drug-delivery devices.114 Four years later, in Brown &
Williamson, the Supreme Court invalidated the rule on
statutory interpretation grounds.115 Specifically, a five-judge
majority concluded that tobacco products were not drugs or
of judicial deference to an agency position, the plain text of the drug and device
definitions lend themselves to an expansive interpretation. Cf. Charlton C.
Copeland, Another Explanation of Justice Gorsuch’s Bostock Vote, REGUL. REV.
(July 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/J2MZ-ZUND (observing that Justice
Gorsuch’s strict textualism produced an expansive interpretation of Title VII
protections, contradicting expectations based on political alignment); see also
Bostock v. Clayton County., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020) (“When the express
terms of a statute give us one answer and extratextual considerations suggest
another, it’s no contest. Only the written word is the law, and all persons are
entitled to its benefit.”).
112. See, e.g., Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000).
113. Id.
114. See generally DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT
AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A DEADLY INDUSTRY (2001). A drug-delivery device is a
kind of combination product. Combination products are products “comprised
of two or more regulated components, i.e., drug/device, biologic/device,
drug/biologic, or drug/device/biologic, that are physically, chemically, or
otherwise combined or mixed and produced as a single entity.” 21 C.F.R.
§ 3.2(e)(1) (2020). The FDA regulates combination products consistent with its
“primary mode of action,” which is mode of action that is expected to give the
greatest contribution to the product’s effects. 21 U.S.C. § 353(g)(1).
115. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 133.
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devices under the FDCA. One reason, among others, that the
majority offered was that “Congress ha[d] enacted six separate
pieces of legislation . . . addressing the problem of tobacco use
and human health,” none of which provided the FDA a role in
regulating tobacco products.116
The intersection of the FDA’s jurisdiction with that of the
Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC) offers
additional examples. For instance, the CPSC’s statutory
authority over consumer products was one reason the FDA cited
in 2002 for declining to assert jurisdiction over an implantable
chip used for non-medical identification purposes.117 As a second
example, in 2003 the Second Circuit struck down an FDA
regulation requiring certain child-proof packaging for drugs and
dietary supplements partly because the Poison Prevention
Packaging Act “specifically and unambiguously targets the
accidental poisoning problem” and it is the CPSC—not the
FDA—that administers that law.118
This limit on the FDA’s jurisdiction, however, is unlikely to
clearly exclude all, or perhaps even many, emerging
non-therapeutic uses.119 Congress has not enacted laws (other
than the FDCA) that specifically regulate many non-therapeutic
uses, such as cognitive enhancement technologies, akin to how
the Brown & Williamson majority described the non-FDCA laws
that specifically targeted tobacco products.120 Drugs intended
for recreational uses are one obvious exception. Congress has
enacted non-FDCA legislation that specifically addresses many
of these products, through, for example, the federal Controlled
Substances Act (CSA). But the CSA expressly envisions the

116. Id. at 143.
117. HUTT ET AL., supra note 56, at 125–28.
118. Nutritional Health All. v. Food & Drug Admin., 318 F.3d 92, 104 (2d
Cir. 2003).
119. Cf. Noah, supra note 14, at 4 (asserting that the FDA possibly could
assert jurisdiction over firearms notwithstanding the many non-FDCA federal
laws specifically governing firearms).
120. Cf. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 133 (describing
“the tobacco-specific legislation that Congress has enacted”).
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FDA playing a role in regulating controlled substances.121 Even
after the enactment of the CSA, the federal government has
continued to assert that certain substances intended for
recreational uses are drugs under the FDCA.122 Moreover, to the
extent that Congress is considering reforming the CSA through
descheduling certain substances intended for recreational uses,
it has thus far not seemed to consider exempting such
substances from the FDCA’s drug definition.123 Thus, even for
drugs intended for recreational uses that are subject to other
federal laws, courts may not determine that the FDA lacks
jurisdiction.
F.

Safety and Effectiveness

Yet another, potentially powerful, line of reasoning that has
been offered to limit the scope of the drug and device definitions
is the argument that it would be impossible for the FDA to
determine that non-therapeutic uses of drugs and devices are
safe and effective. Under this view, the FDCA’s standard for
demonstrating safety and effectiveness would create an
effective ban on non-therapeutic uses.124 Thus, if Congress did
not intend to ban such technologies, it could not have intended
them to be drugs and devices subject to FDA jurisdiction.
This argument has been used to limit the scope of FDA
jurisdiction in two high-profile—and arguably, highly
politicized—instances. The first again involves the FDA’s
attempt to assert jurisdiction over tobacco products in 1996 and
121. See, e.g., Patricia J. Zettler et al., Implementing A Public Health
Perspective in FDA Drug Regulation, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 221, 240 (2018).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Travia, 180 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119 (D.D.C.
2001); cf. Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 479 (1939)
(discussing the idea of congressional acquiescence, where the silence of
Congress, particularly when it has opportunities to amend a statute, may
indicate its agreement with a particular statutory interpretation).
123. See, e.g., Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement
Act of 2020, H.R. 3884, 116th Cong. (2020), https://perma.cc/RD75-UXAS; cf.
O’Connor & Lietzan, supra note 66 (discussing the FDA’s extensive
jurisdiction over cannabis intended for medical uses, even after descheduling).
124. See, e.g., Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 137 (2000).
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FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. In addition to citing
the federal laws specifically regulating tobacco products to
support its conclusion that FDA lacked jurisdiction, the
majority in Brown & Williamson also reasoned that the FDA
could not determine tobacco products to be safe and effective,
and, therefore, FDA oversight would amount to a ban on the
products.125 Because the majority determined that Congress did
not intend to ban tobacco products altogether, the majority
reasoned that Congress could not have intended the FDA to
regulate tobacco products.126 Notably, the majority reached this
conclusion without disagreeing that tobacco products are
intended to affect the structure or function of the body—and
despite the fact that the FDA itself said that it could find certain
tobacco products to be safe and effective.127
The argument that the FDA could not find tobacco products
to be safe and effective might be persuasive, given the
well-known harms associated with the products. But this
reasoning has been extended elsewhere more recently. As states
increasingly have turned to purchasing substances for lethal
injection executions that the FDA has not approved,128 states
have faced legal challenges grounded in arguments that they
are obtaining drugs in violation of the FDCA.129 Against this
125. Id. The majority offered several additional reasons, including that
Congress had enacted more specific statutes to regulate tobacco products as
noted in Part II.E.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 139. The FDA argued, for example, that tobacco products could
be viewed as safe and effective because a ban on the addictive products would
have negative public health effects. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and
Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and
Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,397 (Aug. 28, 1996) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897).
128. See, e.g., Seema K. Shah, Experimental Execution, 90 WASH. L. REV.
147, 173 (2015).
129. See, e.g., Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2013). States have
turned to illicit supply chains for various reasons, including that legitimate
pharmaceutical companies have stopped manufacturing the substances used
for executions or have stopped being willing to sell substances for executions,
particularly since the European Union’s 2011 prohibition on trade in “goods
which could be used for capital punishment.” Commission Implementing
Regulation 1352/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 338) 31.
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background, in May 2019 the Department of Justice’s Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) issued an opinion—that is binding on
FDA—asserting that substances intended for human executions
are not “drugs” within FDA’s authority.130 Among other reasons,
the OLC explained that such substances cannot be drugs
because “the regulation of such articles under the FDCA would
effectively require their prohibition because they could hardly
be found ‘safe and effective’ for such an intended use.”131 Similar
to the majority opinion in Brown & Williamson, OLC reached
this conclusion even though it acknowledged that “[a]rticles
used in capital punishment do literally ‘affect the structure or
any function of the body.’”132 Moreover, as OLC also
acknowledged, the FDA had long regulated substances for
animal euthanasia as drugs,133 concluding that they are safe
and effective for that purpose when they “result[] in a humane
and painless death.”134
Although this argument regarding safety and effectiveness
has, so far, been employed in these somewhat limited
circumstances—for tobacco products and for means of
execution—it is not difficult to imagine its application to
emerging markets of non-therapeutic uses that otherwise could
fall within the drug and device definitions.135 For example, as
state and local governments decriminalize recreational
cannabis (and other botanical drugs, such as psychedelic
mushrooms), arguments that, notwithstanding their effect on
the body’s function, the FDA should not regulate recreational
uses of drugs because it cannot assess the safety and

130. See 2019 OLC Memo, supra note 17, at 1.
131. Id. (citing Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 137–39).
132. Id. at 10 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C), (h)(3)).
133. See id. at 15 n.9.
134. Compliance Policy Guide § 650.100 Animal Drugs for Euthanasia,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 1995), https://perma.cc/3PQQ-JWTX.
135. Cf. Noah, supra note 14, at 37 (considering pathways to marketing a
‘safe and effective’ firearm, if the FDA asserted jurisdiction over firearms as
devices).
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effectiveness are likely to emerge.136 As another example,
companies are increasingly showing interest in developing brain
stimulation machines or brain-computer interfaces to enhance
cognitive function rather than to treat disorders like depression,
and commentators have begun to raise questions about whether
FDA could consider such technologies to be safe and effective.137
Accordingly, assessing the validity of safety and effectiveness as
a limit on the drug and device definitions is useful for
understanding the regulatory landscape for new markets and
technologies.
III. EVALUATING THE SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF
NON-THERAPEUTIC USES
This Part argues for skepticism about limiting the FDA’s
jurisdiction based on arguments that the FDA could never
determine that non-therapeutic uses are safe and effective. As a
descriptive matter, such arguments will rarely be correct. The
FDA assesses drug and device uses on a case-by-case basis, and
the FDCA and FDA regulations give the agency tremendous
flexibility in determining what evidence is needed to
demonstrate that the benefits of a particular use outweigh its
risks.138 Moreover, a careful review demonstrates that the
agency has a not-insubstantial track record of evaluating the
safety and effectiveness of non-therapeutic uses and has not
judged those non-therapeutic uses to be without significant
benefits.139 This is not to say that the agency treats therapeutic
136. Cf. Benton Bodamer (@TripleB_Esq), TWITTER (Jan. 30, 2020 10:14
PM), https://perma.cc/5EFJ-2R9U (showing a tweet from an attorney with
expertise in cannabis raising a similar concern about psychedelic mushrooms).
137. See, e.g., Nick Statt, Elon Musk Launches Neuralink, a Venture to
Merge the Human Brain with AI, VERGE (Mar. 27, 2017, 4:10 PM), https://
perma.cc/FGJ5-PJML; Lucille M. Tournas & Walter G. Johnson, Elon Musk
Wants to Hack Your Brain, SLATE (Aug. 5, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://perma.cc
/MXH9-8JSK.
138. See Merrill, supra note 91, at 1782 (“FDA exercises effectively
unchallengeable authority to dictate the number and kinds of studies required
to support approval and nearly unreviewable discretion to interpret the
results.”).
139. See infra Part III.B.
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and non-therapeutic uses identically—there are instances, such
as with silicone breast implants, when the agency was willing
to authorize therapeutic uses when it did not authorize
non-therapeutic ones.140 But, for non-therapeutic uses, the
agency is more tolerant of serious risks, including risks of death,
and relatively lower benefits than might be expected.141
A.

Flexible Statutory Standards

The FDA’s role in approving drugs and devices is, perhaps,
the most well-known way that it evaluates products’ safety and
effectiveness. For drugs, this approval authority applies to “new
drugs”142 that are not “generally recognized . . . as safe and
effective,”143 including in the FDA’s view most, if not all,
prescription drugs as well as certain over-the-counter (OTC)
drugs.144 Devices undergo more varied forms of premarket
review than drugs do, with the type of review typically
depending on the level of risk posed by a device and its
novelty.145 The highest risk, “class III” devices—such as

140. See Mehlman, supra note 24, at 702.
141. Cf. id. at 699–703 (“[E]ither . . . the [FDA] feels that the risks posed
by saline implants are so small that they are outweighed by cosmetic as well
as by therapeutic benefits, or . . . the agency simply has not come to grips with
the enhancement/therapy distinction.”).
142. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
143. Id. § 321(p).
144. General recognition of safety and effectiveness is a high bar to clear
that requires at least as much evidence of safety and effectiveness as FDA
approval does. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., 412
U.S. 609, 629 (1973). In addition, to fall outside of the definition of a “new
drug” a drug must have been marketed to a material extent and for a material
time—which the FDA generally interprets as requiring that the drug has been
legally marketed in sufficient quantities, for example in another country, for
at least five years. See 21 U.S.C. 321(p)(2); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: TIME AND EXTENT APPLICATIONS FOR
NONPRESCRIPTION DRUG PRODUCTS 6 (2011), https://perma.cc/45SZ-S8S2
(PDF).
145. See Merrill, supra note 91, at 1109–11 (describing the different forms
of premarket review that apply to different device classifications based on risk
profile); W. Nicholson Price, II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L.
REV. 421, 438 (2017) (same).
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pacemakers and implanted brain stimulators—typically require
FDA approval.146
The precise language of the statutory standards for
approving new drugs under a new drug application (NDA) and
devices under a premarket approval application (PMA) differ.147
But the general idea is the same: to approve a use of new drug
or device, the FDA must determine that the product is safe and
effective for its proposed indication and that the proposed
labeling is not false or misleading.148 Because drugs and devices

146. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
147. Compare id. § 355(d) (describing grounds for refusing to approve a
new drug application), with id. § 360e(d)(2) (describing grounds for refusing
premarket approval of a device). Specifically, the drug approval standard
requires, among other things, “adequate tests” to show the drug is safe and
“substantial evidence” of effectiveness, demonstrated through “adequate and
well-controlled investigations.” Id. § 355(d). The device approval standard
requires “reasonable assurance” of safety and effectiveness consisting of “one
or more” “well-controlled investigations” or other “valid scientific evidence.”
Id. §§ 360c(a)(3), 360e(d). Whether these standards are the same—or instead,
the device standard is a lower one—in practice and as a statutory
interpretation matter, is debated. See Peter Barton Hutt et al., The Standard
of Evidence Required for Premarket Approval Under the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 605, 608–09 (1992) (“Congress
intended medical device manufacturers seeking premarket approval to be
subject to a different, more flexible, standard of evidence of safety and
effectiveness than new drug sponsors.”); Merrill, supra note 91, at 1821–23
(arguing that Congress did not intend the device model to mimic the drug
model but acknowledging the FDA’s post-1993 policy shift toward equally
rigorous expectations for approval of both drugs and devices).
148. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). This Article focuses on drugs approved under
“new drug applications” (NDAs) pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1), which are
often thought of as “brand-name” drugs. The FDA also approves generic new
drugs through a separate, abbreviated process. See id. § 355(j). As with other
FDA authorization processes, FDA review and approval of abbreviated new
drug applications (ANDAs) is intended to assure the safety and effectiveness
of the drugs. See id. § 355(j). This goal, however, is accomplished by
demonstrating that the generic drug is the same as the brand-name drug (with
a few minor exceptions not related to safety and effectiveness). From that
similarity, the safety and effectiveness of the generic drug can be inferred. See
id. Thus, by the time the FDA would evaluate an ANDA for a non-therapeutic
use, the agency would have already made the determination most relevant to
this Article—the initial determination that the non-therapeutic use is safe and
effective when it approved the brand-name drug for that use. Cf. Eric Biber &
J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and Practice of Regulatory
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cannot be completely risk-free (and are not equally effective for
all people), “safe and effective” generally means that the
benefits of the product’s intended use outweigh its risks.149 The
FDCA requires that the drug or device manufacturer submit to
the FDA numerous kinds of information showing that this
approval standard is met, which typically consists of data from
one or two well-designed clinical trials.150 Once a use of a drug
or device is approved the FDA’s weighing of its risks and
benefits does not end. The FDA also regulates marketed
products, including having the authority to withdraw an
approval if the agency determines that the benefits of the
product’s uses no longer outweigh its risks—perhaps because
new risk information comes to light, as can happen once a
product is used widely and outside of a controlled research
environment.151
Although this overview makes safety and effectiveness
determinations sound straightforward, there is inevitably
uncertainty in scientific evidence and making benefit-risk
determinations inherently involves certain value judgments.152
Perhaps for this reason, the FDCA, at least arguably, gives the
FDA substantial discretion to decide what evidence is sufficient
Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133, 190 (2014) (describing
the ANDA process as an example of the government’s permitting power).
149. See generally Erika Lietzan & Patricia J. Zettler, Regulating
Medicines in the United States, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE
HEALTH LAW (David Orentlicher & Tamara Hervey eds., Oxford Univ. Press
2020).
150. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
151. See id. § 355(e) (describing the bases upon which the Secretary may
withdraw approval of a new drug application in light of information discovered
later); id. § 360e(e) (same with respect to devices); 21 C.F.R. § 814.46 (2020)
(allowing for withdrawal of premarket approval for devices pursuant to 21
U.S.C. § 360e(e)).
152. See Efthimios Parasidis et al., Assessing COVID-19 Emergency Use
Authorizations, FOOD & DRUG L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 163) (on
file with author) (making a similar point); cf. Eli Y. Adashi et al., When Science
and Politics Collide: Enhancing the FDA, 364 SCI. 628, 630 (2019)
(“Determining the basic facts about safety, efficacy, or adverse events
reporting should be science-driven and as apolitical as possible.”); Craig J.
Konnoth, Drugs’ Other Side Effects, 105 IOWA L. REV. 171, 206–07 (2019)
(noting that FDA is a “political entity”).

418

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 379 (2021)

to show that the benefits of a particular use of a drug or device
outweigh its risks.153 For example, in its regulations regarding
new drug approvals, the FDA states that it must “exercise its
scientific judgment to determine the kind and quantity of data
and information an applicant is required to provide for a
particular drug to meet the statutory standards [for safety and
effectiveness].”154
Consistent with the wide discretion granted to the FDA in
the statute and implementing regulations, the FDA has
determined that varying kinds of evidence are sufficient (or not)
to demonstrate safety and effectiveness of different uses of
drugs and devices, and varying kinds of risks and benefits
produce favorable (or not) benefit-risk ratios.155 One
controversial example was the FDA’s 2016 decision to approve
Exondys 51 (eteplirsen) for Duchenne muscular dystrophy, a
severe form of the disease that almost exclusively affects boys
and is associated with life expectancies only into patients’
twenties.156 The FDA approved Exondys 51 based on an
uncontrolled trial in just twelve patients, and against the
recommendation of the agency’s Peripheral and Central
Nervous System Drugs Advisory Committee.157 This decision
153. Merrill, supra note 91, at 1782; cf. Konnoth, supra note 152, at 173– 74
(arguing that FDA should take a broad approach to the evidence relevant to
its approval decision).
154. 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(c) (2020).
155. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FACTORS TO CONSIDER WHEN
MAKING BENEFIT-RISK DETERMINATIONS IN MEDICAL DEVICE PREMARKET
APPROVAL AND DE NOVO CLASSIFICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF, (2019), https://perma.cc/N2A7-9JYL (PDF);
Wallach et al., supra note 18, at 220.
156. See Duchenne and Becker Muscular Dystrophy, MEDLINEPLUS,
https://perma.cc/C9P4-8V7P (last updated Aug. 18, 2020).
157. See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, Approving a
Problematic Muscular Dystrophy Drug: Implications for FDA Policy, 316
JAMA 2357, 2357 (2016). It is worth noting that, in the wake of seemingly
unprecedented political interference with FDA decision-making during the
COVID-19 pandemic, see, for example, Parasidis et al., supra note 152, at 165,
the process that the FDA followed in approving Exondys 51 has, in some ways,
aged well. Specifically, the highest-ranking relevant career official determined
the drug would be approved, over the objection of other career staff. The FDA
Commissioner, a political appointee, let that decision stand partly because of
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caused strong disagreement within the agency,158 as well as
vocal criticism from scholars.159 Even among critics of the
decision, however, few, if any, argued that the FDA failed to
comply with the FDCA in determining that Exondys 51 met the
safety and effectiveness standard for approval.
B.

Applying the Standards to Non-Therapeutic Uses

The following four examples (two drug and two device)—
although not exhaustive—demonstrate how the FDA has
applied the flexible statutory standards for safety and
effectiveness when approving non-therapeutic uses.160 These
a strong norm within the agency that career staff, rather than political staff,
typically make these decisions. See Memorandum from Robert M. Califf,
Comm’r of Food & Drugs, to Janet Woodcock, Dir, CDER 2 (Sept. 16, 2016),
available at https://perma.cc/7A7M-XLHE [hereinafter EXONDYS 51 MEMO].
158. See, e.g., EXONDYS 51 MEMO, supra note 157, at 17.
159. See, e.g., Kesselheim & Avorn, supra note 157, at 2357; see also
Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Deborah B. Leiderman, Cannabis for Medical Use:
FDA and DEA Regulation in the Hall of Mirrors, 74 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 246,
279 n.191 (2019) (describing the Exondys 51 approval as “controversial”);
Jordan Paradise, Three Framings of “Faster” at the FDA and the Federal Right
to Try, 11 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 53, 81 (2020) (describing the
“controversial” Exondys 51 approval and explaining that “[i]n a stunningly
similar manner, the FDA recently approved . . . a second DMD drug from
Sarepta [the Exondys 51 manufacturer], in December 2019”).
160. These examples focus on new drug applications and premarket
approval applications, where the FDCA standards for safety and effectiveness
are most relevant for this Article’s analysis. Most legally marketed devices,
however, are not FDA-approved. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-09-190, MEDICAL DEVICES: FDA SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT
HIGH-RISK DEVICE TYPES ARE APPROVED THROUGH THE MOST STRINGENT
PREMARKET REVIEW PROCESS 6 (2009). Instead, manufacturers of low-risk
devices generally do not have any premarket notification requirements, while
manufacturers of moderate risk devices—class II devices, the class into which
most devices fall—frequently obtain FDA “clearance” for marketing their
devices by submitting an application known as a “510(k).” A 510(k)
demonstrates that a manufacturer’s device is “substantially equivalent” to a
device already on the market—it has the same intended use and the same
technological characteristics as a “predicate device,” which allows the FDA to
infer that the new device is as safe and effective as the currently marketed
one. See, e.g., Ralph F. Hall & Michelle Mercer, Rethinking Lohr: Does “SE”
Mean Safe and Effective, Substantially Equivalent, or Both?, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI.
& TECH. 737, 753–54 (2012) (describing the process for showing substantial
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examples suggest both that the agency has accepted varied
evidence as showing safety and effectiveness of non-therapeutic
uses, and that agency review is not an insurmountable obstacle
to marketing non-therapeutic uses.
1.

Hair Growth Drugs

Hair growth drugs—first approved roughly thirty years
ago, when the FDA approved Rogaine161—provide examples of
lucrative non-therapeutic uses, which the FDA approved based
on relatively minimal evidence of effectiveness or despite
relatively serious risks. When the FDA first approved Rogaine,
its active ingredient, minoxidil, was already approved at the
time—but for a therapeutic use (hypertension) and in a tablet,
rather than topical form.162 It was through developing the
therapeutic use of minoxidil, when subjects in clinical trials
began to experience hair growth, that the manufacturer, The
Upjohn Company (Upjohn), came to learn that the drug may
have the potential to address hair loss as well.163

equivalence). It is through 510(k) process, for example, that the FDA has
authorized the marketing of certain decorative contact lenses. See, e.g.,
DECORATIVE LENSES GUIDANCE, supra note 4, at 3.
161. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Rogaine Approval History, https://
perma.cc/74U4-6VMQ (detailing Rogaine’s approval history). Although hair
loss can be a result of medical problems or treatments, such as low thyroid
conditions or chemotherapy drugs, and in such circumstances may be viewed
as a medical problem, the drugs approved for regrowing hair do not improve
or prevent such hair loss according to their FDA-approved labeling. Cf. EEOC
v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1219 n.2 (D. Minn. 2001)
(concluding that a health plan’s decision to exclude Propecia was unlike its
decision to exclude hormonal birth control pills because Propecia is a
“non-medically necessary and elective treatment[]”).
162. See Loniten Approval History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
perma.cc/RW6V-USX8; see also W. Nicholson Price, II, Making Do in Making
Drugs: Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REV.
491, 562 n.229 (2014) (discussing minoxidil’s patent history). For a discussion
of how new uses for already authorized products are developed, see Erika
Lietzan, Paper Promises for Drug Innovation, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 168,
171– 77 (2018).
163. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Riahom Corp., 641 F. Supp. 1209, 1212 (D.
Del. 1986).
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Presumably because the tablet form of minoxidil was
associated with serious cardiovascular adverse effects and a
systemic effect of the drug was not needed for hair growth,164
Upjohn sought to develop a topical version.165 Upjohn spent
three years conducting clinical trials, which ultimately showed
that 26 percent of men using the topical formulation reported
“moderate to dense hair regrowth” at four months, compared to
11 percent in the placebo groups.166 In studies of women taking
the drug, 19 percent reported moderate hair growth at 8
months, compared to 7 percent in the placebo group.167
Although those numbers do not seem particularly
impressive, the risks associated with the topical version of
minoxidil—scalp irritation being the most common one—are not
particularly serious.168 And the FDA determined that the
benefits of topical minoxidil outweighed its risks, ultimately
approving it to regrow hair on the scalp in 1988 for men and in
1991 for women, as a prescription drug.169 Likely partly because
of its relatively minor risks, the FDA approved an application to
switch Rogaine to over-the-counter status in 1996.170
The FDA originally approved the other leading hair
regrowth drug—a tablet called Propecia—in 1997.171 As with
164. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., LONITEN LABELING (2015), https://
perma.cc/A53S-2YRH (PDF) (containing the FDA’s minoxidil labeling data).
165. See Upjohn, 641 F. Supp. at 1213.
166. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ROGAINE LABELING (2005), https://
perma.cc/LP9V-747R (PDF); see also Upjohn, 641 F. Supp. at 1213 (describing
the time and money that Upjohn spent on developing Rogaine). Since the
original formulation was approved, a stronger formulation has been approved
for which studies have shown increased effectiveness. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., NDA 20-834 (1997), https://perma.cc/PVX9-64BH (PDF).
167. See ROGAINE LABELING, supra note 166.
168. See id.
169. See, e.g., Will Lester, Hair-Raising Tale: No Fame for Men Who
Discovered Rogaine, DAILY GAZETTE (May 13, 1996), at A6.
170. See Rogaine Approval History, supra note 161. For a discussion of
some of the business reasons that manufacturers may follow this pattern of
first marketing a drug as a prescription-only, and later requesting a switch to
OTC status, see Valerie Junod, Drug Marketing Exclusivity Under United
States and European Union Law, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 479, 514 (2004).
171. See Propecia Approval History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
perma.cc/3EGX-DUFY.
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Rogaine, the active ingredient in Propecia, finasteride, had been
previously approved for a therapeutic use: for treating enlarged
prostates causing urinary and other problems in men.172 The
therapeutic version of finasteride, however, was approved at a
dosage five times higher than was needed for the hair growth
indication and Merck, the manufacturer, sought approval of a
lower dose for hair growth in men.173
Propecia’s effectiveness was demonstrated in three
randomized, controlled, blinded clinical trials of men with
moderate to mild hair loss, looking at subjects’ hair counts and
self-assessments.174 The trials showed that men using Propecia
were rated as having significantly more hair on both measures
than were the men using the placebo—for example, at twelve
months, 65 percent of men using Propecia were rated as having
increased growth compared to 37 percent of men in the placebo
group.175 Propecia is, however, associated with significant risks.
At the time of its original approval, the drug was known to be
associated with risks to male fetuses if taken by pregnant
women and with effects on Prostate-Specific Antigen levels,

172. See Proscar Approval History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
perma.cc/9YU9-B3GN; see also Lars Noah, This Is Your Products Liability
Restatement on Drugs, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 839, 874–75 (2009) (“[O]ne decade
later, the totality of published research continues to support the widespread
use of this still-approved drug for treating [enlarged prostate].”). A third drug,
dutasteride, was approved shortly after finasteride for a similar therapeutic
purpose. See Avodart Approval History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
perma.cc/B38X-C8ZQ. Although studies have suggested dutasteride may be
effective for hair growth in men, it is not approved for that indication. See, e.g.,
Elise A. Olson et al., The Importance of Dual 5a-Reductase Inhibition in the
Treatment of Male Pattern Hair Loss: Results of a Randomized
Placebo-Controlled Study of Dutasteride Versus Finasteride, 55 J. AM. ACAD.
DERMATOLOGY 1014, 1022–23 (2006).
173. See Noah, supra note 172, at 875 (describing the history of Propecia’s
development and noting the risks associated with pill splitting). The higher
dose of finasteride is associated with certain risks, such as an increased risk
of breast cancer in men, that the lower dose is not known to be. See Steve T.
Bird et al., Male Breast Cancer and 5ǂ-Reductase Inhibitors Finasteride and
Dutasteride, 190 J. UROLOGY 1811, 1811 (2013).
174. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PROPECIA LABELING (2014), https://
perma.cc/5543-YPPU (PDF).
175. See id.
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which are used to screen for prostate cancer.176 In 2011, it
became known that the drug is also associated with an increased
risk of high-grade prostate cancer.177 Despite these risks, the
FDA approved, and has not withdrawn its approval of,
finasteride for hair loss—instead choosing to mitigate the risks
through approving the drug only for men, including warnings in
the FDA-approved labeling, and continuing to require a
prescription for the drug.178
In addition to the differences in the formulations between
the therapeutic and non-therapeutic versions of minoxidil
(Rogaine’s active ingredient) and finasteride (Propecia’s active
ingredient), the manufacturers likely sought approval of the
hair loss indications—rather than simply relying on off-label
use—because they wanted to actively promote those indications.
Rogaine’s initial approval in 1988 came shortly after the FDA’s
policies on direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising of prescription
drugs became more permissive.179 Rogaine’s manufacturer,
Upjohn, then began one of the first DTC “disease awareness”
advertising campaigns,180 which featured individuals describing
the “problems” associated with hair loss (e.g., “Can an emerging
bald spot . . . damage your ability to get along with others,
176. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., NDA 20-834 APPROVAL PACKAGE (1997)
https://perma.cc/S85B-PVC8 (PDF).
177. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PROPECIA (LABELING (2011), https://
perma.cc/DJ4S-BQX3 (PDF). Concerns about other risks associated with the
drug, such as erectile dysfunction and depression, have also been raised. See,
e.g., Dan Levine, Court Let Merck Hide Secrets about a Popular Drug’s Risks,
REUTERS (Feb. 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/59KG-357H.
178. See id.
179. See Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs;
Withdrawal of Moratorium (Notice), 50 Fed. Reg. 36,677, 36,678 (Sept. 9,
1985); see also Wayne L. Pines, A History and Perspective on
Direct-to-Consumer Promotion, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 489, 493 (1999)
(describing how companies undertook more aggressive “help-seeking”
advertisements after the FDA lifted restrictions in 1985).
180. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420,
1456 (1999); see also Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers:
Assessing the Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141, 142 n.4
(1997) (elaborating on the pharmaceutical industry’s efforts to promote drugs
directly to consumers).
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influence your chances of obtaining a job or a date or even
interfere with your job performance?”) and suggested that
consumers talk with their physicians about their hair loss.181
Upjohn’s campaign apparently worked—Rogaine became a
widely sold drug, with global revenue estimated at 1.2 billion
dollars in 2015.182 Likewise, Propecia was widely and
successfully promoted DTC, becoming the second most highly
promoted DTC prescription drug within just a few years of
approval and reaching roughly 400 million dollars in sales per
year before generic versions entered the market.183
2.

Botox

The regulatory history for Botox (onabotulinumtoxinA) is
similar to that for Rogaine and Propecia in many ways, although
the risks of Botox are arguably more serious than those
associated with either Rogaine or Propecia. Botox was originally
approved as a prescription drug for therapeutic uses—the first
approved indication was for treating adult eye muscle
movement disorders.184 After over ten years on the market as an
approved therapy,185 in 2002, the FDA approved Botox, under
the brand-name “Botox Cosmetic,” for “the temporary

181. Teresa Moran Schwartz, Consumer-Directed Prescription Drug
Advertising and the Learned Intermediary Rule, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 829,
837 (1991).
182. Minoxidil Market Insights, GLOB. MKT. INSIGHTS (Nov. 2018), https://
perma.cc/NY28-XYDK.
183. See Pines, supra note 179, at 507–08; Jim Edwards, Why Merck’s Hair
Loss Drug Could Make Its Income Statement Go, Um, Limp, CBS NEWS (Jan.
13, 2011, 5:11 PM), https://perma.cc/874A-ZPE4.
184. See Botox Approval History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
perma.cc/4S2K-E3KL.
185. See id. Following its original approval, the FDA approved Botox for
additional therapeutic uses, including cervical dystonia in 2000, and then after
Botox Cosmetic’s approval, severe primary axillary hyperhidrosis in 2004,
upper limb spasticity and the prevention of headaches in patients with chronic
migraines in 2010, urinary incontinence in 2011, overactive bladder in 2013,
and lower limb spasticity in 2016. See id.
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improvement in the appearance of moderate to severe glabellar
lines” (i.e., frown lines between the eyebrows).186
Botox’s use for this purpose is fairly intuitive—it is a
neurotoxin that blocks nerve signals telling muscles to move,
and muscle contractions cause wrinkles.187 And the FDA’s 2002
approval of Botox for glabellar lines was supported by seemingly
robust evidence of effectiveness. Allergan,188 Botox’s
manufacturer, conducted two randomized, double-blind, placebo
controlled clinical trials, including a total of 537 subjects with
moderate to severe frown lines.189 The subjects were given Botox
Cosmetic (or placebo) and rated thirty days later—by
themselves and the researchers—on the severity of their
wrinkles.190 Significantly more subjects who received Botox
Cosmetic were rated as having no lines or only mild lines at
thirty days (roughly 80 percent versus 3 percent).191
As a neurotoxin, however, Botox is also associated with
serious risks. At the time that the FDA first approved Botox for
wrinkles, the drug’s FDA-approved labeling including warnings
about rare cardiovascular adverse events, including potentially
fatal ones, as well as the transmission of viral diseases such as
Creutzfeld-Jakob disease (CJD), a degenerative, fatal brain

186. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 2002 BOTOX LABELING 2 (2002), https://
perma.cc/4GWH-VN5L (PDF). Indicative, perhaps, of the porous line between
therapeutic and non-therapeutic uses, although the indication on the
FDA-approved labeling does not use therapeutic terms, in the approval letter,
the agency described the approved use as the “treatment of glabellar lines.”
Botox Cosmetic Approval Letter, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 12, 2002),
https://perma.cc/QWD4-UBZ7 (last updated Apr. 14, 2002) (emphasis added).
187. See, e.g., 2002 BOTOX LABELING, supra note 186, at 1.
188. Allergan is the manufacturer of many other aesthetic drugs and
devices, including a dermal filler marketed as Juvederm, see infra Part II.A.4,
as well as others not discussed in detail in this Article, such as Latisse, a
prescription drug approved for eyelash growth and Kybella, a prescription
drug approved for eliminating fat in the chin (i.e., eliminating a “double chin”).
See, e.g., Meg Tirrell (@megtirrell), TWITTER (Sept. 14, 2018, 6:21 AM), https://
perma.cc/6TJB-F37R (describing Allergan’s “medical aesthetics day”
conference).
189. See 2002 BOTOX LABELING, supra note 186, at 2.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 3 (noting p<.001).
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disorder.192 Since that original approval, additional risks have
become known—including that Botox may spread from the site
of injection to other areas of the body, producing symptoms of
botulism, such as breathing difficulties that are potentially
fatal.193 One way the FDA manages these risks is by requiring
a prescription for Botox.194 Additionally, after the FDA received
new authority in 2007 to require Risk Evaluation and
Mitigation Strategies (REMS) for prescription drugs that pose
the most serious risks, the agency required a REMS for Botox
for both its therapeutic and non-therapeutic uses, which
consisted primarily of patient labeling until the REMS
requirement was released in 2012.195 The drug’s labeling also
includes a “black box warning” about its fatal risks—the kind of
warning that the FDA reserves for the most serious risks
associated with drugs.196 None of the risks of Botox, however—
including the potentially fatal ones—have led the FDA to
decline to approve, or withdraw approval of, the use of Botox for
glabellar lines.
Moreover, these risks did not lead the FDA to decline to
approve two additional non-therapeutic uses for Botox—lateral
canthal lines (i.e., crow’s feet) in 2013 and forehead lines in
192. See id. at 9.
193. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 2009 BOTOX LABELING 1 (2009),
https://perma.cc/5BDH-6KT8 (PDF) .
194. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BOTOX LABELING 1 (2020), https://
perma.cc/TQW6-MCWC (PDF) (detailing prescription requirements).
195. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BOTOX APPROVAL LETTER 2–3 (2009),
https://perma.cc/GJP2-B4PS (PDF). The decision to release the REMS
requirement for Botox was consistent with the agency’s policy decision, at the
time, to stop requiring REMS that primarily consist of patient labeling. But
patient labeling, known as a Medication Guide, is still required for Botox. See
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BOTOX RELEASE REMS REQUIREMENT LETTER 2
(2012), https://perma.cc/5JG4-AUGW (PDF); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
GUIDANCE: MEDICATION GUIDES—DISTRIBUTION AND INCLUSION IN RISK
EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES (REMS), 2–6 (2011), https://perma.cc
/BRF6-D2ZH (PDF).
196. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c) (2020); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY: WARNINGS AND PRECAUTIONS, CONTRAINDICATIONS, AND BOXED
WARNING SECTIONS OF LABELING FOR HUMAN PRESCRIPTION DRUG AND
BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS CONTENT AND FORMAT 2 (2011), https://perma.cc/9NBHZNNN (PDF).

THE FDA’S POWER

427

2017—for which the effectiveness data are similar to that for
glabellar lines.197 Although health care professionals could, and
undoubtedly did, provide Botox for these purposes before the
FDA approvals, Allergan, nevertheless, undertook the clinical
trials necessary to assess the drug’s safety and effectiveness for
these uses, to obtain the FDA’s approval.198 That investment—
as well as DTC advertising campaigns, which recently have
begun to target men as well as women—seemingly has paid
off.199 By 2006, yearly sales of Botox were over $1 billion with
approximately half due to cosmetic uses.200 By 2013, yearly sales
were over $2 billion and the continued pursuit of new uses for
Botox was perceived as a key driver of Allergan’s overall
value.201
3.

Breast Implants

Breast implants provide an example of devices that the
FDA has approved for a non-therapeutic use, and the long,
controversial regulatory history—particularly for silicone
breast implants—offers a few insights into the FDA’s approach
to non-therapeutic uses.202 Although breast implants have been

197. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BOTOX APPROVAL LETTER 1 (2013),
https://perma.cc/D9FJ-9XS2 (PDF); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BOTOX
APPROVAL LETTER 1 (2017), https://perma.cc/TNV9-TKAX (PDF).
198. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 2013 BOTOX LABELING 10 (2013),
https://perma.cc/YC7V-ZKEL (PDF). It is, perhaps, worth noting that Allergan
challenged the FDA’s policies restricting off-label promotion of Botox on First
Amendment grounds, although Allergan withdrew its lawsuit as part of a
settlement. See Complaint at 26–38, Allergan v. United States, No. 09-01879
(D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2010) (dismissed per stipulation).
199. See Aliko Carter, Deion Sanders Loves BOTOX and Is Getting His
Message Out to Men, FORBES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/H2PB-PGU6.
200. See Emilia Petrarca, On the 15th Anniversary of Botox, an
Appreciation of How It’s Changed Everyone, W MAG. (Apr. 14, 2017), https://
perma.cc/49YS-K6VQ.
201. See Joseph Walker, Botox Itself Aims Not to Age, WALL ST. J. (May 18,
2014), https://perma.cc/KNC6-5QKH.
202. See, e.g., MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL
EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE, 54–57 (1996); Dresser et
al., supra note 7, at 706; David E. Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87
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on the market since the early 1960s, Congress did not create the
modern scheme for FDA regulation of devices until 1976 and the
FDA did not require breast implant manufacturers to submit
PMAs until 1991.203 Today there are over two hundred PMAs
approved for breast implants.204 Like hair growth drugs and
Botox, the FDA has approved breast implants for both
therapeutic and non-therapeutic uses—but for breast implants
the agency has more clearly appeared to weigh the value of the
product’s
therapeutic
and
non-therapeutic
benefits
differently.205
The FDA approved the first PMAs for breast implants in
2000.206 The applications covered saline breast implants
intended both for aesthetic uses and for therapeutic
reconstruction following medically necessary mastectomies.207
At the time of approval, the FDA judged the implants—whether
intended for aesthetic or reconstructive purposes—to be
associated with various risks, including serious risks such as the
need for additional surgery over the course of the recipient’s
life.208 The FDA, however, judged the benefits of both the
aesthetic and reconstructive uses to outweigh these risks,
provided certain conditions—such as conducting a ten-year
post-approval follow-up study—were met.209
CAL. L. REV. 457, 459–60 (1999); Regulatory History of Breast Implants in the
U.S., supra note 11.
203. See Regulatory History of Breast Implants in the U.S., supra note 11.
204. See Premarket Approval (PMA) Database, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://perma.cc/JA4L-L2LX (last updated Oct. 12, 2020) (yielding roughly 230
approved applications when searching for “breast implant” in the FDA’s PMA
database).
205. See, e.g., Mehlman, supra note 24, at 702.
206. See Regulatory History of Breast Implants in the U.S., supra note 11.
207. See id. Allergan, the manufacturer of Botox, was also the
manufacturer of one of the first approved breast implants. See Premarket
Approval of Natrelle Saline Breast Implants, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://perma.cc/F2FX-YTHL (last updated Oct. 19, 2020).
208. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SUMMARY OF SAFETY AND
EFFECTIVENESS DATA OF SALINE-FILLED MAMMARY PROSTHESIS 4 (2000), https://
perma.cc/ZX5A-CYT2 (PDF).
209. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., NATRELLE APPROVAL ORDER 1
(2000), https://perma.cc/E64E-XG74 (PDF).

THE FDA’S POWER

429

This is not to say that the agency judged the benefits of
non-therapeutic uses as equal to those of therapeutic uses. Until
2006, the FDA authorized only the reconstructive, but not the
aesthetic, use of silicone breast implants—which at the time
were thought to be associated with risks greater than those
associated with saline implants.210 This different approach
likely reflected the FDA’s view that that those potential greater
risks were outweighed by reconstructive but not aesthetic
benefits.211
4.

Dermal Fillers

As with breast implants, the FDA—since the early 1980s—
has approved as devices dozens of dermal fillers, under
brand-names such as Restylane and Juvederm.212 Dermal fillers
typically consistent of materials such as collagen or hyaluronic
acid that are injected into the body to smooth wrinkles or add
volume to the skin.213 Although dermal fillers are injectable
products, they are regulated as devices, rather than drugs,

210. See Regulatory History of Breast Implants in the U.S., supra note 11;
see also Mehlman, supra note 24, at 702 (explaining the FDA’s decision to limit
research of silicone gel-filled implants to reconstructive purposes). Some
concerns about silicone breast implants being associated with, for example,
autoimmune disorders were ultimately not borne out. See, e.g., Bernstein,
supra note 202, at 484; Dresser et al., supra note 7, at 743. The aesthetic
indication for the saline breast implants also was limited to adults, whereas
the indication for reconstruction was not, suggesting that the FDA may have
weighed the two uses differently. See SUMMARY OF SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS
DATA OF SALINE-FILLED MAMMARY PROSTHESIS, supra note 208, at 1 (listing
indications for use). On the other hand, the differing indications may simply
reflect the rarity with which reconstruction likely occurs in minors.
211. See Mehlman, supra note 24, at 702.
212. A search for “dermal filler” in the FDA’s PMA database yields
sixty-four approved applications. Premarket Approval (PMA) Database, supra
note 204.
213. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., RESTYLANE LABELING 1 (2016),
https://perma.cc/A9UY-4NJD (PDF); Dermal Fillers Approved by the Center
for Devices and Radiological Health, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
perma.cc/9S6H-XK82 (last updated Aug. 29, 2018).
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because they work primarily through physically filling the skin
rather than through chemical action.214
Like many non-therapeutic uses of drugs, the FDA
determined that at least some dermal fillers are effective based
on clinical trials assessing both researchers’ and subjects’ own
judgments that the dermal fillers had reduced the appearance
of wrinkles.215 Also like both breast implants and
non-therapeutic uses of drugs, dermal fillers are not risk-free.
The most common adverse events are relatively minor,
including bruising, pain, and redness.216 They, however, also are
associated with serious risks, such as necrosis and anaphylactic
shock, as well as aesthetic adverse effects, such as movement of
the filler or the formation of permanent, hard nodules on the
skin.217 Consistent with these risks, the FDA restricts dermal
fillers to prescription use.218
Moreover, the FDA’s approval decisions for dermal fillers
provide some evidence the FDA also judges the risks and
benefits of different non-therapeutic uses differently. For
example, the FDA first approved a permanent, rather than a
temporary, dermal filler in 2006 only for one non-therapeutic
use in patients over twenty-one years of age—nasolabial folds
(wrinkles on the side of the mouth that extend upward toward
the nose)—but not for the other non-therapeutic uses for which
temporary dermal fillers are approved, such as lip and cheek
augmentation.219 Permanent dermal fillers pose similar risks to
214. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1), (h); see also Genus Med. Techs., LLC v.
FDA, 427 F. Supp. 3d 74, 77 (D.D.C. 2019) (describing the drug and device
definitions); Lars Noah, Growing Organs in the Lab: Tissue Engineers
Confront Institutional “Immune” Responses, 55 JURIMETRICS J. 297, 314 n.93
(2015) (“The FDA regulates some injectable products as medical devices.”
(citation omitted)).
215. See, e.g., RESTYLANE LABELING, supra note 213, at 1.
216. See Dermal Fillers (Soft Tissue), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
perma.cc/9CY5-JGD3 (last updated Nov. 26, 2018).
217. See id.
218. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., RESTYLANE APPROVAL ORDER 1 (2016),
https://perma.cc/ZFT7-9KS2 (PDF).
219. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ARTEFILL LABELING 1 (2006), https://
perma.cc/2C9Q-3TRL (PDF); Dermal Fillers (Soft Tissue), supra note 216.
Artefill, now marketed as Bellafill, is described as permanent because it is
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temporary dermal fillers but, because of their permanence,
certain adverse effects, such as lumps—or simply dissatisfaction
with the results—are more difficult to address.220 In 2014, the
FDA also approved an arguably-therapeutic use for the
permanent dermal filler (filling acne scars in people over
twenty-one years of age), underscoring the links between
therapeutic and non-therapeutic uses and showing that
therapeutic uses might sometimes follow non-therapeutic
ones.221
IV. CONTEMPLATING THE FUTURE
As a descriptive matter, the FDCA gives the FDA
significant latitude to determine whether a particular product
use is safe and effective, and FDA review of the safety and
effectiveness of non-therapeutic uses has not proven to be an
impossible impediment to their marketing. But that still leaves
question of whether it should.222 This Part argues, first, that this
question may become more salient, as changes in technology,
law, and policy are poised to force the FDA to more frequently

made of non-absorbable polymethylmethacrylate beads, rather than
absorbable collagen or hyaluronic acid, and has been shown to last at least five
years in clinical trials. ARTEFILL LABELING, supra, at 1.
220. See Dermal Fillers (Soft Tissue), supra note 216.
221. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BELLAFILL LABELING 1 (2014), https://
perma.cc/5V6Y-TXGY (PDF); see also Joan Kron, This New Filler Is a Game
Changer, ALLURE (Sept. 10, 2015), https://perma.cc/5WXK-FCTT (explaining
how Bellafill works to fill smile lines and acne scars).
222. There may be relevant normative questions in addition to the
question of whether the FDA should be willing to use its discretion to conclude
that non-therapeutic uses are safe and effective, such as what kinds of
information are appropriate for the FDA to consider in assessing benefits and
risks. See, e.g., Konnoth, supra note 151, at 187. Moreover, there may be
important practical questions about the FDA’s institutional norms and
resources. For example, there may be questions about whether the FDA’s
current scientific staff have the expertise to review the safety and effectiveness
of recreational and enhancing non-therapeutic uses, with which the agency
does not have the same amount of experience as it does with aesthetic uses.
Cf. id. at 219 (addressing arguments that the FDA lacks expertise to address
certain kinds of “side effects” of drugs).
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confront its possible authority over not just aesthetic uses of
drugs and devices, but also recreational or enhancing uses.223
This Part then begins to explore the normative question of
how the FDCA’s safety and effectiveness standard should be
applied to non-therapeutic uses. It considers several of the
purposes that FDA approval serves—an analysis that
preliminarily suggests the agency could reasonably take various
different approaches to assessing the safety and effectiveness of
non-therapeutic uses. This, in turn, provides further support for
the Article’s claim that arguments grounded in the idea that the
FDCA’s safety and effectiveness standards would necessarily
ban non-therapeutic uses will not be useful tools for determining
the scope of FDA jurisdiction.
A.

Beyond Aesthetic Uses

Non-therapeutic uses of drugs and devices are nothing
new.224 For centuries, humans have used caffeine and ginkgo
biloba to improve energy, focus, or memory, equipment and
chemical interventions to improve athletic performance, and
numerous substances, such as cocaine and psychedelics,
recreationally.225 As Part III shows, the FDA has long regulated
aesthetic uses of drugs and devices.226 Against this background
one might wonder why consider the FDA’s jurisdiction over
non-therapeutic uses particularly at a time when the COVID-19
pandemic is highlighting pressing questions about the agency’s
application of its drug and device authorities to
desperately-needed therapeutic uses during public health
emergencies.227 But the time is, arguably, ripe to consider the
223. See, e.g., Patricia J. Zettler & Erika Lietzan, A Special Exception for
CBD in Foods and Supplements?, 25 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 467, 467 (2020)
(discussing the increased relevance of FDA jurisdiction over aspects of the
cannabis industry).
224. See, e.g., Maxwell J. Mehlman, Cognition-Enhancing Drugs, 82
MILBANK Q. 483, 484 (2004).
226.
See, e.g., id.
226. See supra Part III.
227. For a small selection of some recent scholarship discussing the FDA’s
approach to drugs, vaccines, and devices intended to treat, prevent, or
diagnose COVID-19, see Jerry Avorn & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Up Is Down—
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future of non-therapeutic uses because evolutions in technology,
as well as in law and policy, appear poised to create markets of
non-therapeutic uses that will more frequently intersect with
the FDA’s drug and device powers.228
For example, some hope that emerging technologies may
prove to be better—safer or more effective—for non-therapeutic
uses than existing technologies have been.229 At the same time,
at least some novel non-therapeutic technologies may be
challenging to legally market without FDA authorization.
Human genome editing provides a dramatic example.230 After
decades of work to develop gene therapies, newer techniques,
such as CRISPR, have made genome editing easier and cheaper
to carry out.231 Genetic interventions hold promise for both
therapeutic and non-therapeutic uses. A genetic intervention
that effectively builds muscle might treat patients with
Pharmaceutical Industry Caution vs. Federal Acceleration of COVID-19
Vaccine Approval, 383 NEJM 1706 (2020); Evans & Clayton, supra note 6;
Ameet Sarpatwari et al., Missed Opportunities on Emergency Remdesivir Use,
324 JAMA 331 (2020); Benjamin N. Rome & Jerry Avorn, Drug Evaluation
During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 392 NEJM 2282 (2020); Parasidis et al.,
supra note 152; Yaniv Heled et al., Regulatory Reactivity: FDA and the
Response to COVID-19, FOOD & DRUG L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (on file with
author); Jacob S. Sherkow, Regulatory Sandboxes and the Public Health (in
progress) (on file with author).
228. Cf. Taleed El-Sabawi, Why the DEA, Not the FDA? Revisiting the
Regulation of Potentially-Addictive Substances, 16 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 317, 321
(2020) (analyzing the history of FDA authority over “illicit sales of
non-narcotic drugs, like barbiturates and amphetamines”); Max A. Cherney,
Tilray Partners with Novartis in Big Pharma’s First Deal of its Kind with Big
Marijuana, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 18, 2018, 10:16 AM), https://perma.cc/YF645YDU (PDF) (describing Novartis’s partnership with a medical cannabis
company).
229. Many FDA-regulated products that traditionally have been popular
for non-therapeutic purposes have been ineffective or unsafe. For instance, a
dietary supplement company conducted a study comparing the cognitive
enhancing effects of coffee with that of its own so-called “nootropic”
supplement—and found that coffee worked better than its own product. See
Chrissy Farr, This Start-Up Raised Millions to Sell ‘Brain-Hacking’ Pills, but
its Own Study Found Coffee Works Better, CNBC (Nov. 30, 2017, 4:02 PM),
https://perma.cc/PQ56-53R6.
230. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 15, at 137.
231. See, e.g., Jacob S. Sherkow et al., Is It ‘Gene Therapy’? 5 J.L. &
BIOSCIENCES 786, 789 (2018).
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muscular dystrophy and be used for healthy individuals
interested in enhancing physical performance.232 But this
example of overlapping therapeutic and non-therapeutic uses is
likely to be rare because “the specificity of edited cells will make
[off-label] applications less likely” than for traditional drugs and
devices—making any non-therapeutic uses more likely to be
subject to the FDA’s premarket review requirements.233
Moreover, because of the potential serious risks associated with
genetic interventions, the FDA may be unlikely to decline to
enforce premarket review requirements for such uses.234
Perhaps more importantly, changes to the FDCA, as well as
to other areas of law and policy, also may lead to
non-therapeutic uses more frequently coming before the FDA.
An example involving the FDCA comes from the 21st Century
Cures Act of 2016.235 That law amended the FDCA to ease the
development of new uses of already approved products—such as
the use of Botox for wrinkles, when the drug was already
approved for therapeutic uses.236 Specifically, the FDCA now
permits the FDA to consider “real world evidence,” including
“data . . . from sources other than randomized clinical trials,”
such as from clinical practice,237 when evaluating new uses of
already approved products.238 Manufacturers may be more
likely to seek FDA approval of non-therapeutic drug uses if this
provision enables approval of such uses without expensive
clinical trials, but instead based on experience in clinical
practice—such as the evidence that patients using Rogaine’s
active ingredient for hypertension also experienced hair
232. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 15, at 9.
233. Id. at 152; see supra Part II.C (discussing the regulatory regime for
off-label uses).
234. Cf. Information about Self-Administration of Gene Therapies, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/H6X4-55BR
(cautioning consumers on the risks of do-it-yourself gene therapies).
235. Pub. L. No. 114-255 § 3022, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016).
236. See supra Part III.B.2.
237. 21 U.S.C. § 355g(b).
238. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255 § 3022, 130 Stat.
1033; Jordan Paradise, 21st Century Citizen Pharma: The FDA &
Patient-Focused Product Development, 44 AM. J.L. & MED. 309, 310 (2018).

THE FDA’S POWER

435

growth.239 The 21st Century Cures Act also amended the FDCA
to encourage the FDA to incorporate “patient experience data”
into its evaluations, which may further ease the development of
non-therapeutic uses for which patient self-assessments are
important indicators of effectiveness.240
Likewise, legal developments not directly tied to the FDA’s
enabling statutes also may bring new non-therapeutic uses
before the agency. Most notably, widespread state level
cannabis decriminalization (or de facto decriminalization) has
allowed quasi-legal markets to emerge.241 Both the FDA and the
traditional pharmaceutical industry have paid increasing
attention to cannabis products, albeit with a primary focus on
therapeutic uses of such products.242 But particularly now that

239. See Rachel E. Sherman et al., Real-World Evidence—What Is It and
What Can It Tell Us?, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2293, 2296 (2016); Jonathan P.
Jarow et al., Multidimensional Evidence Generation and FDA Regulatory
Decision Making: Defining and Using “Real-World” Data, 318 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 703, 704 (2017); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., USE OF REAL-WORLD
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING FOR MEDICAL DEVICES:
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG STAFF 8 (2017), https://perma.cc
/8CWF-XB6D (PDF); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS
USING REAL-WORD DATA AND REAL-WORLD EVIDENCE TO FDA FOR DRUGS AND
BIOLOGICS: DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2019), https://perma.cc/87AC6RD4 (PDF); see also Jenny Bryan, How Minoxidil Was Transformed From an
Antihypertensive to Hair-Loss Drug, PHARM. J. (July 20, 2011), https://
perma.cc/V93D-5BQW (describing the active ingredient in Rogaine’s evolution
from a hypertension treatment to a drug for hair growth); W. Nicholson Price
II, Drug Approval in a Learning Health System, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2413, 2462
(2018) (“[I]f FDA learns more about drugs based on how they work in the real
world, that information should be used to address how drugs are labeled, sold,
and used.”). On the other hand, if the FDA loosens its restrictions on off-label
promotion—because of First Amendment jurisprudence or for other reasons—
manufacturers may have fewer incentives to seek FDA authorization of
non-therapeutic uses for already-approved drugs and devices. See, e.g., FDA
MEMO, supra note 21, at 1; Kapczynski, supra note 21, at 2359; see also
Lietzan, supra note 162, at 171–83 (describing the process and incentives for
developing new uses).
240. See Paradise, supra note 238, at 321–22.
241. See, e.g., Kamin, supra note 15, at 624; Robert A. Mikos, Marijuana
Localism, 65 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 719, 767 (2015).
242. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CANNABIS AND CANNABIS-DERIVED
COMPOUNDS: QUALITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR CLINICAL RESEARCH: GUIDANCE FOR

436

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 379 (2021)

at least eleven states and the District of Columbia have
decriminalized adult recreational use of cannabis,243 in the near
future the FDA may face questions about its authority over
recreational cannabis products.244 Indeed, as of the time of
writing, the most recent federal bill to propose decriminalizing
cannabis at the federal level expressly stated that it would not
“affect or modify” the FDCA.245
Questions about FDA jurisdiction over recreational uses of
substances other than cannabis are likely to arise as well. Since
2018, Ann Arbor, Denver, Oakland, Santa Cruz, and
Washington, D.C. have established policies that effectively
decriminalize certain uses of psychedelic substances, such as
psilocybin.246 Additionally, in November 2020, Oregon voters
passed one initiative that permits the therapeutic use of
psilocybin under certain conditions and one that de facto
decriminalizes possession small amounts of all drugs.247 In the
INDUSTRY (2020), https://perma.cc/XD8T-L5XA (PDF); Cherney, supra note
228; O’Connor & Lietzan, supra note 71, at 850.
243. Marijuana Overview, NAT’L CONF. ON STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 17,
2019), https://perma.cc/V43T-FLRP.
244. Cf. O’Connor & Lietzan, supra note 71, at 902–03 (speculating how
cannabis products intended for recreational use might be treated by the FDA).
245. Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement Act of 2020,
H.R. 3884, 116th Cong., https://perma.cc/RD75-UXAS.
246. See Mason M. Marks, Controlled Substance Regulation for the
Covid-19 Mental Health Crisis, 72 ADMIN. L. REV. 649, 654 (2020) (noting
Denver, Oakland, Santa Cruz, and Washington, D.C’s de facto
decriminalization policies); Ann Arbor Decriminalizes Magic Mushrooms,
Psychegenic Plants, A.P. NEWS (Sept. 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/T22E-GCYM
(PDF); see also Dustin Marlan, Beyond Cannabis: Psychedelic
Decriminalization and Social Justice, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 851, 872
(2019) (“We are now beginning to see the decriminalization of psychedelics,
namely psilocybin, at the state and municipal levels as well.”).
247. Oregon Measure 109, Psilocybin Mushroom Services Program
Initiative (2020), BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/23L9-QMAW; Oregon
Measure 110, Drug Decriminalization and Addiction Treatment Initiative
(2020), BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/WZ6S-NAB2; see Cleve R. Wootson, Jr.
& Jacyln Peiser, Oregon Decriminalizes Possession of Hard Drugs, As Four
Other States Legalize Recreational Marijuana, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2020),
https://perma.cc/PS9L-UU8R (“Oregon voters approved a controversial ballot
measure decriminalizing possession of small amounts of so-called hard drugs,
including cocaine, heroin, oxycodone and methamphetamines.”).
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wake of these changes, some are predicting the psychedelic
market will explode, which, in turn, could raise questions about
FDA jurisdiction over recreational uses of these substances.248
B.

Considering the Purposes of Safety and Effectiveness
Review

If technological, legal, and policy developments do in fact
give rise to more, or new, non-therapeutic uses that potentially
intersect with FDA jurisdiction, the FDA will be faced with both
a legal question about whether it can regulate such technologies
under its drug and device authorities, and also, if it can, how it
should apply the statutory standards for safety and
effectiveness to such uses. To begin to examine that question,
this section considers three of the public health purposes the
FDA’s premarket approval processes for drugs and devices are
thought to serve: protecting people from unsafe and ineffective
products, addressing information asymmetries between people
and manufacturers, and incentivizing the development of
socially valuable information.249 This analysis suggests that
there are arguments that finding non-therapeutic uses to be
safe and effective, or taking a flexible approach to such
assessments, may be a normatively permissible approach for the
agency.250
248. See North American Psychedelic Drugs Market Could Exceed $6.8
Billion by 2021, FIN. NEWS MEDIA (Jan. 6, 2021), https://perma.cc/7GVKY4WG.
249. See, e.g., FDA Memo, supra note 21; Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA
in Innovation Policy, supra note 21, at 361; Kapczynksi, supra note 21, at 2360;
Ariel Katz, Pharmaceutical Lemons: Innovation and Regulation in the Drug
Industry, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 13 (2007); cf. President John
F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Protecting the Consumer
Interest (Mar. 15, 1962), https://perma.cc/2WJS-QP7R (describing four
consumer rights: the right to safety, the right to be informed, the right to
choose, and the right to be heard).
250. To be clear, this Article does intend to affirmatively argue that any
safety and effectiveness determinations for specific products were correct (or
incorrect), nor that the overall approach that the FDA has seemingly adopted
for assessing the benefits and risks of aesthetic uses is the best one. Instead,
this Part aims to show that the range of approaches the agency could
reasonably take to assess the safety and effectiveness of non-therapeutic uses
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Protecting People from Unsafe and Ineffective Products

The traditional rationale for requiring the FDA’s premarket
review of drug and device safety and effectiveness is protecting
people from unsafe and ineffective products.251 Considering this
purpose, Rachel Sachs has explained that one way to
conceptualize the FDA’s task is that, in implementing its
premarket approval processes, the FDA must balance the risk
of making Type I errors—in which the agency authorizes an
unsafe or ineffective use of a drug or device—against the risk of
making Type II errors—in which the agency fails to authorize a
safe and effective use of a drug or device.252 Making too many
Type I errors will subject patients and consumers to harmful
uses of products and undermine public trust in the agency.253
Making too many Type II errors would deny patients access to
often desperately needed therapies.254 And there have long been
differing views about whether the FDA generally is striking the
right balance between Type I and Type II errors for therapeutic
uses.255 Some have argued that the FDA may set the bar for
demonstrating safety and effectiveness too low,256 while others,
for example, have argued for open access to therapeutic uses on
the ground that patients have a protected liberty interest in

is at least arguably broad. This is in turn provides additional evidence against
arguments that the FDCA would categorically preclude the agency from
finding non-therapeutic uses safe and effective.
251. See, e.g., Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, supra
note 21, at 345.
252. See, e.g., Rachel E. Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement, 102 MINN. L.
REV. 2307, 2323–24 (2018).
253. See id. at 2323.
254. See id. at 2324.
255. See, e.g., Robert Kemp & Vinay Prasad, Surrogate Endpoints in
Oncology: When Are They Acceptable for Regulatory and Clinical Decisions,
and Are They Currently Overused? 15 BMC MED., NO. 15, 2017, at 5; Nicholas
S. Downing et al., Clinical Trial Evidence Supporting FDA Approval of Novel
Therapeutics, 2005–2012, 311 JAMA 368, 372–73 (2014); C. Frederick Beckner,
III, Note, The FDA’s War on Drugs, 82 GEO. L.J. 529, 531 (1993).
256. See, e.g., Kemp & Prasad, supra note 257, at 5.
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accessing medical interventions regardless of whether the FDA
has authorized their use (albeit without success in the courts).257
Similarly, the question of how to strike the balance between
Type I and Type II errors in the context of non-therapeutic uses
might lend itself to differing views. Arguably, avoiding Type I
errors is more important for non-therapeutic than therapeutic
uses.258 Under this view, because the benefits of a
non-therapeutic use are inherently less than those of a
therapeutic use, the risks of a non-therapeutic use should be
quite low, or the benefits quite high (or both), for the FDA to
determine that the use has a favorable benefit-risk balance.259
That is, the FDA should err on the side of protecting consumers
from risky and ineffective non-therapeutic uses, particularly
where consumers do not have the same strong interest in access
that terminally and seriously ill patients do.260 This might lead
the FDA, for example, to refuse to approve Botox and dermal
fillers for aesthetic uses because of the risk of death associated
with both—even if rare.261
By contrast, minimizing Type I errors might be less
important, or at least no more important, for non-therapeutic
than for therapeutic uses.262 For therapeutic uses, patients may
not have much choice as to whether to use a particular drug or
257. See Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (finding no protected
liberty interest to use experimental drugs); see also Seema Shah & Patricia
Zettler, From a Constitutional Right to a Policy of Exceptions: Abigail Alliance
and the Future of Access to Experimental Therapy, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y,
L., & ETHICS 135, 141 (2010) (analyzing the Abigail Alliance decision).
258. Cf. supra Part III.B.3 (describing the FDA’s differing evaluations of
therapeutic and non-therapeutic uses of silicone breast implants).
259. See Legitimate Medicine, supra note 25, at 442.
260. Cf. Leah Isakov et al., Is the FDA Too Conservative or Too Aggressive?
A Bayesian Decision Analysis of Clinical Trial Design, 211 J. ECONOMETRICS
117, 128 (2019) (positing that traditionally accepted proportions of Type I error
are too conservative for drugs treating terminal illnesses, but too large in other
instances).
261. See supra Part III.
262. Cf. What Lies Ahead, supra note 22, at 321 (raising this argument as
a possibility). The analysis in Part III suggests this view might be more
consistent with the approach the FDA has actually adopted for assessing
safety and effectiveness of aesthetic uses.
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device as a practical matter—there may be only one therapy for
their disease or condition, or their choice may be dictated by
their physician’s or insurer’s views.263 Thus, patients might
merit a high level of protection from dangerous or ineffective
therapies that, in essence, their disease or condition would force
them to take (and that the health care system would be forced
to pay for).264 Consumers, on the other hand, who voluntarily
engage in non-therapeutic uses may be in need of less protection
(assuming a free choice, including a non-addictive product).265
Consistent with this idea, numerous kinds of consumer products
outside of the FDA’s jurisdiction—including those that can
cause grave harm—may be marketed without a premarket
review process.266 Accordingly, once some minimal threshold of
safety and effectiveness is cleared, perhaps consumers should
be able to choose to use non-therapeutic technologies, like hair

263. Cf. Pauline Bartolone, Behind the EpiPen Monopoly: Lobbying
Muscle, Flailing Competition, Tragic Deaths, KHN (Sept. 8, 2016), https://
perma.cc/4H7A-AYKR (discussing a period when there was no alternative to
Mylan’s EpiPen for treating anaphylactic shock).
264. See Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Speech:
Capturing the Benefits of Competition for Patients (Mar. 7, 2018), https://
perma.cc/A7RW-5EFK (“Is a patient really in a position to make an
economically-based decision? . . . Of course not.”); see also Sachs, supra note
252, at 2309 (“In the United States, federal law requires Medicare and
Medicaid to cover most, and in many cases all, FDA-approved drugs.”).
265. See What Lies Ahead, supra note 22, at 322 (suggesting that
consumers need less protection). The assumption of a free choice may only
rarely be a fair one. Some of the social or ethical concerns about
non-therapeutic uses involve the idea that consumers will not be able to freely
chose to engage in or decline such uses. For example, some have argued that
consumers will not or do not freely choose aesthetic changes or enhancement,
but instead opt to alter their appearance or enhance performance because of
societal pressure to do so. See, e.g., Nicholas S. Fitz et al., Public Attitudes
Toward Cognitive Enhancement, 7 NEUROETHICS 173, 178 (2013).
266. Cf. Noah, supra note 14, at 5–9 (considering the possibility of FDA
regulation of firearms, given the “ceaseless casualties” associated with them);
Peter Yankowski, Police: Newtown Man Killed in Saw Accident While Clearing
Tree, NEWSTIMES, https://perma.cc/6HRH-VFPL (last updated Aug. 7, 2020,
10:23AM) (documenting the tragic death of a man who accidentally killed
himself with a saw).
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growth drugs, cognitive enhancements, and recreational
cannabis, so long as they are informed of the relevant risks.267
Similarly, minimizing Type II errors may be either more (or
equally) important, or less important, for non-therapeutic uses
as for therapeutic ones. There is a long-standing, and strongly
held belief among some in the United States that people have a
right to choose potentially therapeutic interventions without
government interference.268 A belief in such freedom of choice
may apply more forcefully for non-therapeutic uses, where
justifications for robust FDA gatekeeping may not persuade
even some who endorse the agency’s role in the context of
therapeutic uses.269 This, in turn, would suggest that avoiding
Type II errors is equally, if not more, important for
non-therapeutic uses compared to therapeutic ones.
Conversely, virtually all stakeholders agree that safe and
effective therapies for patients, and particularly terminally and
seriously ill patients, should reach the market as quickly as
possible.270 The disagreement lies primarily in how much and
what kinds of evidence are needed before such products are

267. There also may be pragmatic reasons for the FDA to be less concerned
about Type I errors for non-therapeutic uses than for therapeutic uses. For
example, agencies might elect to regulate cautiously or not at all to “avoid
backlash and to preserve their own political capital.” That is, rather than
interpret the FDCA’s safety and effectiveness standards as setting a high bar
for non-therapeutic uses, the FDA might want to preserve political capital for
fights other important public health matters. Sharon B. Jacobs, The
Administrative State’s Passive Virtues, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 565, 623 (2014); cf.
William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4 (2003) (discussing issues of government
regulation generally).
268. See Lewis A. Grossman, The Origins of American Health
Libertarianism, 13 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 76, 80 (2013)
(“[S]truggles for freedom of therapeutic choice have recurred throughout
American history.”).
269. Cf. L.O. Gostin & K.G. Gostin, A Broader Liberty: JS Mill,
Paternalism and the Public’s Health, 123 PUB. HEALTH 214, 216–19 (2009)
(describing some paternalistic justifications for public health regulations).
270. Cf. Shah & Zettler, supra note 257, at 195–96 (asserting that
terminally and seriously ill patients can have compelling claims for accessing
unapproved drugs while arguing against widespread access outside clinical
trials).

442

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 379 (2021)

marketed (i.e., in how to operationalize “safe and effective” and
“as quickly as possible”).271 But the same likely cannot be said
of denying or delaying access to non-therapeutic uses, like
aesthetic breast implants. Such a denial or a delay might be in
tension with principles of individual autonomy. But it would not
cause death, worsening of illness, or other tangible physical
harm to a person. Moreover, limiting access to non-therapeutic
uses may not as easily give rise to the arguments rooted in
individual liberty interests that terminally ill patients have
asserted when seeking access to experimental interventions for
therapeutic purposes.272 Thus, considering various views on
minimizing Type I or Type II errors for non-therapeutic uses,
demonstrates that the FDA arguably would be justified in
adopting varied approaches to assessing such uses’ safety and
effectiveness.
2.

Addressing Information Asymmetries

Another purpose that the FDA’s premarket approval
processes can serve is addressing information asymmetries
between people and manufacturers.273 Drugs and devices are
described as “credence goods,” meaning their safety,
271. See articles cited supra note 255 (citing differing opinions on the
appropriate level of evidence needed before FDA approval).
272. Cf. Shah & Zettler, supra note 257, at 141 (examining the argument
that terminally and seriously ill patients have a liberty interest accessing
experimental interventions). If certain non-therapeutic uses, and in particular
enhancing uses, become widespread such that they create a “new normal,”
problems of access may become more important. For example, if only wealthy
individuals can access highly effective cognitive enhancers, that could reify or
exacerbate societal inequalities. See Anita L. Allen & Nicolle K. Strand,
Cognitive Enhancement and Beyond: Recommendations from the Bioethics
Commission, 19 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 549, 551 (2015). Such access problems,
however, typically are not about the initial question of FDA authorization
based on safety and effectiveness—but on how technologies are distributed
once demonstrated safe and effective. Cf. Development & Approval Process |
Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://perma.cc/BR2X-X5FK (last updated
Oct. 28, 2019) (outlining the FDA drug approval process and making no
assertions about drug accessibility or price).
273. See HENRY G. GRABOWSKI & JOHN M. VERNON, THE REGULATION OF
PHARMACEUTICALS 7 (1983); Katz, supra note 249, at 13–17; Kapczynski, supra
note 21, at 2358.
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effectiveness, and quality cannot be readily and easily evaluated
by the people using them.274 For example, patients can recover
from many diseases and conditions without treatment—if a
patient with symptomatic COVID-19 takes a drug to treat the
condition and then recovers, they, cannot, individually
determine whether the recovery is due to the drug or because
they were among those who would recover from COVID-19
without the drug. The FDA’s premarket review of drug and
device safety and effectiveness, thus, “protect[s] the
misinformed [or uninformed] consumer from better-informed
sellers.”275 As with protecting consumers from unsafe and
ineffective products, considering the FDA’s role in addressing
information asymmetries suggests that the agency reasonably
could adopt various approaches in implementing its premarket
approval requirements for non-therapeutic uses.
Information asymmetries may not be as pronounced for
certain non-therapeutic uses as they are for therapeutic uses.
For example, people may be well-equipped to decide drugs and
devices are effective for aesthetic uses.276 Consistent with this
idea, the FDA has relied on users’ own assessments as a primary
indicator of effectiveness for hair growth drugs, Botox, and
dermal fillers.277 Recreational uses of drugs or devices—if the
user’s goal is to have some fun—likewise may be readily
evaluable by users.278
Yet not all non-therapeutic uses, or aspects of therapeutic
uses, are amenable to user self-assessment. Unlike aesthetic
and recreational uses, users may have difficulty assessing the

274. See Katz, supra note 249, at 13.
275. Id. at 8.
276. Cf. Cierra Miller, I’m 22 Years Old & I Love Botox—Don’t Judge Until
You See My Photos, STYLECASTER (Dec. 13, 2019, 5:53 PM), https://perma.cc
/DP5Y-8GRP (providing a woman’s thoughts on her Botox outcome).
277. See supra Part III.B.
278. Cf. Product Reviews by Customers, MAGIC MUSHROOMS DISPENSARY,
https://perma.cc/L5RM-DNAL (displaying customer comments on magic
mushroom and psychedelic experiences).
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effectiveness of enhancing uses.279 As one example, some studies
have suggested that Ritalin and Adderall—which are commonly
believed to be effective cognitive enhancers—have only small
effects on performance, and only in certain groups.280
Nevertheless, these drugs remain widely used for enhancement,
possibly because people cannot assess drugs’ cognitive
enhancing effects very well themselves.281 Moreover, the risks of
non-therapeutic uses of drugs and devices are generally similar
to those of therapeutic uses.282 Accordingly, even if users can
evaluate benefits for themselves, users may not be able to
anticipate and assess risks of non-therapeutic uses, just as
patients cannot anticipate and assess the risks of therapeutic
uses.283
3.

Incentivizing Information Production

A third example of a purpose of the FDA’s premarket review
of drug and device safety and effectiveness is incentivizing the
development of societally valuable information about the
products. As Rebecca Eisenberg has explained, FDA approval
processes solve an information production problem by requiring
manufacturers to develop rigorous evidence sufficient for the
agency to assess the merits of their products.284 Without an FDA
279. See, e.g., Shaheen E. Lakhan & Annette Kirchgessner, Prescription
Stimulants in Individuals with and Without Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder, 2 BRAIN & BEHAV. 661, 670 (2012).
280. See id. at 669–70 (surveying the results of multiple studies).
281. Cf. id. (describing widespread use of ADHD drugs for academic
performance enhancement).
282. See supra Part III.B.
283. Cf. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“To the
physician, whose training enables a self-satisfying evaluation, the answer may
seem clear . . . [t]o enable the patient to chart his course understandably, some
familiarity with the therapeutic alternatives and their hazards becomes
essential.”).
284. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, supra note 21,
at 370; see FDA MEMO, supra note 21, at 4; Kapczynski, supra note 21, at 2358;
see also Cortez et al., supra note 88, at 376 (“[T]he true challenge, however, is
creating a regulatory framework that encourages high-value innovation while
also preventing the market from being overcome with products that are
ineffective or unsafe.”).
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approval requirement, drug and device manufacturers might
not spend the time and money to conduct the rigorous research
needed to produce this kind of information.285 Producing useful
information about drugs and devices, in turn, helps to encourage
high-value innovation—the development of new products for
which there is good evidence that they do what their sellers
claim.286 As former FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg
said, “innovation doesn’t matter if the product doesn’t work.”287
Again, considering this purpose of FDA review of safety and
effectiveness might suggest that there is more than one
perspective on premarket approval requirements for
non-therapeutic uses. One the one hand, producing rigorous
scientific evidence about non-therapeutic uses may simply be
less important than it is for therapeutic uses. For example, it
may not a societal priority to incentivize the creation of
innovative wrinkle-eliminating drugs that are superior to
Botox. Notably, the FDCA carves out from the drug and device
definitions—and thus the FDA’s drug and device approval
standards—certain non-therapeutic uses through, for example,
separately defining dietary supplements.288
On the other hand, incentivizing information production
could be highly valuable for non-therapeutic uses. Requiring the
production of rigorous information about the actual effects of
novel non-therapeutic uses may necessary for realizing hopes
that these technologies will be better than what has come before
(or at least for understanding whether any such hopes have
been realized).289 For instance, a highly effective and safe
285. See Kapczynski, supra note 21, at 2358. Retaining incentives to
produce information about the effects of drugs and devices is one reason that
FDA policies generally prohibit manufacturers from promoting off-label
uses—if permitted to promote those uses without FDA authorization,
manufacturers would lack not study them. See id. at 2366–67; FDA MEMO,
supra note 21, at 11–14.
286. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 249, at 12.
287. Toni Clarke, In Swansong, FDA Chief Defends Drug Approval
Process, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2015, 8:25 PM), https://perma.cc/4HE5-TGVY.
288. See supra Part II.A.
289. Cf. Allen & Strand, supra note 272, at 551 (advocating for thorough
vetting of non-therapeutic technologies so that society can evaluate them with
accurate information about the extent of their benefits).
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cognitive enhancement technology could be revolutionary in
what it allows individuals, and society at large, to accomplish.290
Likewise, because humans have long engaged in using
substances for recreation and seem unlikely to stop anytime
soon, a product with a relatively safe, non-addictive,
recreational use could provide a significant public health
benefit. But without the scientific evidence necessary to assess
the effects of such non-therapeutic uses, it would be difficult, if
not impossible, to determine whether claims of enhancement or
safety are supported, and challenging to predict the public
health impacts of such uses.
Additionally, although the FDA is not authorized to decide
social and moral questions about non-therapeutic uses,291
scientific evidence about the safety and effectiveness of
non-therapeutic uses might be necessary for individuals, or
society, to answer those questions. As an example, widespread
use of cognitive enhancement technologies known to have very
low risks might pose different social questions than if such
technologies were associated with high risks or a high level of
uncertainty about their risks. Similarly, technologies that
effectively, but reversibly or temporarily, enhance cognitive
capabilities might raise different issues than technologies that
permanently change cognitive abilities.

290. See id. at 550.
291. See FDA’s Response to Public Comment on the Animal Cloning Risk
Assessment, Risk Management Plan, and Guidance for Industry, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://perma.cc/T6CD-WCKG (last updated June 11, 2020);
Fox, supra note 36, at 1139; Gary Marchant et al., Integrating Social and
Ethical Concerns into Regulatory Decision-Making for Emerging Technologies,
11 MINN. J.L., SCI. & TECH. 345, 347–48 (2010). Of course, the line between
what is a health-related concern and what is a social or moral one can be
unclear, and at times government regulators, including the FDA, have mixed
social, moral, and health-related considerations. Additionally, the FDA’s
ultimate judgment that a use’s benefits outweigh its risks (or do not) may
inevitably involve social considerations. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, The FDA’s
Plan B Fiasco: Lessons for Administrative Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 927, 928 (2014)
(arguing that social and political considerations drove the FDA’s resistance to
approving emergency contraceptives over-the-counter for all ages); see also
Konnoth, supra note 152, at 189–93 (considering the “non-health” effects of
FDA-regulated drugs).
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For those non-therapeutic uses that the FDA has approved,
even if the FDA’s ultimate approval decision may have been
flawed—for example, if one disagrees with the conclusion that
the benefits of Botox for facial wrinkles outweigh its risks—
there is at least evidence on which to assess the risks and
benefits of those uses.292 The same cannot be said for
non-therapeutic uses that have not been subject to premarket
review requirements.293 The information production purpose of
the FDCA’s premarket approval provisions, thus, suggests there
may be value in FDA review of non-therapeutic uses—
regardless of how the FDA interprets the flexible statutory
standards for safety and effectiveness.
CONCLUSION
The broadly-written drug and device definitions in the
FDCA potentially subject to FDA oversight numerous
non-therapeutic uses of drugs and devices, from wrinkle
removers to cognitive enhancements to recreational cannabis.
Although commonsense limits on the drug and device
definitions are needed, this Article critiques one limit that is
sometimes offered: the FDA cannot regulate non-therapeutic
uses because it is impossible for those uses to meet the FDCA’s
safety and effectiveness standards for premarket authorization.
This position will only rarely be descriptively correct, and it may
not be normatively correct.294 The agency has been willing to
conclude that the benefits of non-therapeutic uses outweigh
their risks even when they are associated with small benefits,
serious risks, or both—and this approach is, at least arguably,
a reasonable one.295 Better understanding the potential scope of
the FDA’s jurisdiction over non-therapeutic uses, and how the
FDA assesses the safety and effectiveness of such uses, is

292. See supra notes 187–198 and accompanying text.
293. See, e.g., Pieter A. Cohen & Scott Bass, Injecting Safety into
Supplements—Modernizing the Dietary Supplement Law, 381 NEJM 2387
(2019) (describing safety and informational problems associated with dietary
supplements).
294. See supra Part IV.B.
295. See supra Parts III.B, IV.B.
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increasingly important as technological, legal, and policy
developments are poised to create new markets of such uses.

